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Summary 
With the advent of a new constitutional dispensation in South Africa, intimate relationships 
that were not formally recognised, such as customary marriages, became fully recognised 
through designated legislation. Domestic partnerships are, however, afforded only limited 
recognition despite compelling reasons that lead people to domestic partnerships. Domestic 
partners are also discriminated against based on marital status despite a Constitution that 
forbids discrimination based on equality, human dignity and marital status. The object of this 
study is to investigate whether there are sufficient grounds to afford domestic partnerships 
full recognition similar to that granted to civil marriage. This study includes arguments in 
favour and against the recognition of domestic partnerships and a discussion of the reasons 
that lead people into domestic partnerships. There will also be an analysis of the draft 
Domestic Partnership Bill 36 of 2008 to determine the suitability of the draft Bill to regulate 
domestic partnerships. This investigation is conducted with reference to relevant draft Bills, 
legislation, and case law. 
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Chapter 1 
1.1  Introduction 
There is no legislation in South Africa that regulates domestic partnerships despite the fact 
that people have been living in domestic partnerships for centuries.1 The lack of recognition 
of domestic partnerships has to do with the fact that marriage is accepted as a cornerstone 
of society, a better environment for raising children and an integral social institution, while 
domestic partnerships are seen as a threat to the institution of marriage.2 Since the advent 
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 the courts have extended certain 
consequences of marriages to domestic partnerships who meet the requirements for those 
legal consequences. However most of these developments have favoured same-sex 
domestic partners while living heterosexual domestic partners further aggrieved by the lack 
of legal recognition.3  
The current state of the law that views marriage as more important than other forms of 
intimate relationships is untenable and has to be challenged.4 In Volks v Robinson5 the 
Constitutional Court denied the benefits of the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act6 to a 
surviving domestic partner owing to the importance attached to the institution of marriage. 
The Constitutional Court argued that “the distinction between married and unmarried people 
cannot be said to be unfair when considered in the larger context of the rights and 
obligations uniquely attached to marriage”.7 Furthermore the law cannot impose legal 
obligations on domestic partners who have chosen not to marry when the Choice to marry is 
open to them.8 The Constitutional Court further argued that the other issue with regulating 
domestic partnerships is the difficulty in proving the existence of such partnerships.9 It is 
however argued in this study that the arguments advanced by the Constitutional Court are 
not convincing and should not prevent the regulation of domestic partnerships. Marriage and 
domestic partnerships have proven to form a significant part of society. 
                                                          
1  Sinclair and Heaton The law of marriage (JUTA Kenwyn 1996) 269; Hahlo “The law of 
concubinage” 1972 SALJ 321-332.  
2  Schafer “Marriage and marriage like relationships: Constructing a new hierarchy of life 
partnerships” 2006 SALJ 626-647; Singh “Cohabitation relationships revisited: Is it not time for 
acceptance?” 1996 CILSA 317-328; Sinclair and Heaton The law of marriage 291; Hutchings 
and Delport “Cohabitation: A responsible approach” 1992 De Rebus 121-125. 
3  Heaton South African family law 3rd (Lexis-Nexis Durban 2010) 243. See par 2.1 below. 
4  Meyerson “Rethinking marriages and its privileges” 2013 AJ 385-408. 
5  2005 5 BCLR 446 (CC). 
6   Act 27 of 1990 
7  Par 56. 
8  Volks par. 94 
9  Par 95. 
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The law has to be developed towards an approach that focuses on the purpose of family 
rather than marriage. The number of people living in domestic partnerships continues to 
grow. There is, in fact, a decline in the conclusion of marriages in general as more and more 
people are either opting for or are forced into domestic partnerships.10  
1.2  Terminology 
Different terms have been used to refer to domestic partnerships, association libre, 
verhaltnis, living together, concubinage, extra marital relationships, shacking up, quasi-
marriage, private marriage, friendships, paramour, permanent life partnerships, de facto 
marriage, trial marriage and cohabitation.11  
The term “domestic partnership” refers to a relationship of a man and woman who live 
together as husband and wife without concluding a marriage ceremony.12 According to a 
more evolving definition, the term “domestic partnership” connotes an established intimate 
relationship of a permanent nature between two people of the same or opposite sex who live 
together without concluding a marriage ceremony.13  
In this study, the term “domestic partnership” will be the preferred term owing to the fact that 
it is commonly used in South Africa by academic writers and the South African Law Reform 
Commission.14 It is worth noting that the Constitutional Court has used the term permanent 
life partnerships15 and both terms, permanent life partnerships and domestic partnerships, 
are suitable within the South African context owing to the fact that they both connote an 
established intimate relationship of a permanent nature between two people of the same or 
opposite sex who live together without concluding a marriage.16 
 
 
                                                          
10  Hosegood, McGrath and Moultrie Dispensing with marriage: marital and partnership trends in 
rural Kwazulu-Natal, South Africa 2000-2006 2009 http://demographic-research.org/volumes 
120/13/DOI 10.4054/DemRes2009.20.13. Accessed on 28 January 2015. 
11  Sinclair and Heaton The law of marriage 267. 
12  Hahlo The South African law of husband and wife 5th ed (JUTA Kenwyn 1985) 35-36.  
13  South African Law Reform Commission Report on Domestic Partnerships Project 118 (2006); 
South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper on Domestic Partnerships Project 
103 (2003). 
14  De Vos and Barnard “Same sex marriage, civil unions and domestic partnerships in South 
Africa: Critical reflections on an ongoing saga” 2007 SALJ 795-825. 
15  National Coalition for gay and lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC); 
J v Director General, Department of Home Affairs 2003 (5) SA 621 (CC); Du Toit v Minister of 
Welfare and population Development 2003 (4) SA 198 (CC); Satchwell v President of the 
Republic of South Africa 2002 (6) SA (CC).  
16  Heaton Family law 243. 
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1.3  Problem statement 
In South African law, there is no legislation that is promulgated specifically to regulate 
domestic partnerships. Domestic partners receive only limited recognition through the 
extension of ordinary legal rules which are not sufficient to deal with challenges faced by 
domestic partners.17 In light of this, the question is whether domestic partners should receive 
full recognition by the law, thus be regulated by legislation that fully addresses its challenges 
and affords domestic partners legal protection similar to that in civil marriage, customary 
marriages and civil unions. This is problematic in that, during the subsistence and after the 
breakdown of domestic partnerships, partners have no automatic legal protection.18 
Domestic partners are left with no automatic rights to maintenance, duty of support, property, 
inheritance claims or any legal recourse against the estate of the other domestic partner.19 
The area of the law with regard to domestic partnerships is mostly unregulated.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
 
Although the draft Domestic Partnership Bill has been proposed, it is not known when or if 
the draft Bill will become an Act of Parliament. Domestic partners are not protected while 
other forms of intimate relationships, such as civil marriages, civil unions and customary 
marriages are afforded full legal protection.20  
 
1.4  Rationale for the study 
In light of the fact that there is no legislation in South Africa recognising domestic 
partnerships as a formal intimate relationship with legal rights and duties, this study will 
investigate whether there are sufficient reasons to pass legislation that can provide full legal 
recognition to domestic partnerships. The draft Domestic Partnership Bill Notice 36 of 2008 
will be analysed to determine whether the draft Bill provides an acceptable framework for the 
legal recognition of domestic partnerships. In view of the growing number of domestic 
partnerships and a Constitution that protects diversity and forbids discrimination on the 
ground of equality, dignity and marital status,21 it is necessary to investigate whether 
domestic partnerships should receive full legal recognition. In South African law, great 
emphasis is placed on marriage in a way that creates a hierarchy that regards marriage as 
                                                          
17  Smith “The interplay between registered and unregistered domestic partnerships under the 
draft Domestic Partnerships Bill, 2008 and the potential role of the putative marriage doctrine” 
2011 SALJ 560-593. 
18  Goldblatt “Regulating domestic partnerships: A necessary step in the development of South 
African family law” 2003 SALJ 610-628. 
19  Kruuse “Here’s to you Mrs Robinson: Peculiarities and paragraph 29 in determining the 
treatment of domestic partnerships” 2007 SAJHR 380-391. 
20  Ibid at 387. 
21   S 9 of the Constitution. 
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being more important than all other forms of intimate relationships.22 The Civil Union Act23 
has been enacted to co-exist with the Marriage Act.24 This creates the impression that a civil 
marriage is more important than a civil union. It would have been preferable had the 
legislature opted to insert civil unions into the Marriage Act25 rather than enacting new 
legislation to regulate civil unions.26 Furthermore the Civil Union Act27 does not allow minors 
to conclude civil unions while a minor can conclude a marriage in terms of the Marriage 
Act.28  
It is argued that the value placed on marriage above other intimate relationships is 
unjustified as it discriminates against persons based on their marital status, equality, and 
dignity. In Volks, the court argued that it is fair to discriminate between persons based on 
their marital status.29 This, however, should not prevent the regulation of domestic 
partnerships.  
1.5  Points of departure, assumptions and hypothesis  
There are many factors that contribute to people living in domestic partnerships, including 
poverty, unemployment, the migrant labour system and people choosing not to marry.30 The 
assumption in South African law, however, is that people deliberately make a choice not to 
marry but to live in domestic partnerships.31 Based on this choice, it is believed that the law 
cannot impose legal obligations on domestic partners when partners have opted not to make 
legal obligations of a marriage part of their intimate relationship by not concluding a 
marriage.32 
The point of departure is that choice is one factor only among a long list of factors. Everyone 
has a choice however, a domestic partner’s choice may be influenced by a number of factors 
including for instance unemployment or poverty. The realistic choice for many men and 
                                                          
22  See par 1.1 above; Bakker “Chaos in family law: A model for the recognition of intimate 
relationships in South Africa” 2013 PELJ 115-142. 
23   Act 17 of 2006. 
24   Act 25 of 1961. 
25   Act 25 of 1961. 
26   Bakker 2013 PELJ 125. 
27   Act 25 of 1961. 
28   Act 25 of 1961. Ibid. 
29  See par 1.1 above. 
30  Sinclair and Heaton The law of marriage 271-274. 
31  Volks par 92-94. 
32  Volks par 92-94; Mamashela and Carnelly “Cohabitation and the same-sex marriage. A 
complex jigsaw puzzle Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie; Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v 
Minister of Home Affairs 2006 3 BCLR 355 (CC): Case” 2006 Obiter 379-390. 
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women lies between poverty, being homeless, or continuing a domestic partnership with an 
uncertain future and no hope of marriage.33 
Owing to factors such as poverty, patriarchy and unemployment, the financially, emotionally, 
or physically weaker domestic partner often does not have a choice when the financially 
stronger partner is unwilling to marry.34 The law should regulate family law through a system 
of law that acknowledges the difficulty of the choice to marry.35 The submission of this work 
is that limited recognition of domestic partnerships through ordinary legal rules is insufficient 
and the situation is made worse by unequal bargaining powers found in intimate 
relationships.36 
The lack of choice to marry by domestic partners is likely to impact on the choice to register 
domestic partnerships when or if the draft Domestic Partnerships Bill becomes an Act of 
Parliament, as domestic partners will still be faced by the same inequalities. As a result, not 
many domestic partnerships will be registered.37 This is a foreseen problem that will still 
prevail even with legislation on domestic partnerships in place. It is, therefore, argued that a 
registration system or regulation of intimate relationships through contracts is not the best 
method for South African family law. 
South African law should do away with the “choice to marry” argument, as it affords 
recognition only to a minority of intimate relationships. The focus should be on affording legal 
protection to family life as an important social institution.38 The regulation of family law, 
based on the function families fulfil, will afford full legal recognition to all families without 
focusing on the contracts partners sign.39 Denial of the fact that domestic partnerships form 
family units is an infringement of the Bill of Rights.40  
Heterosexual domestic partnerships are, furthermore, entitled to less legal protection than 
same-sex domestic partners, owing to the fact that, prior to the Civil Union Act,41 same-sex 
domestic partners were not allowed to marry but courts afforded certain consequences 
similar to marriage to same-sex domestic partners.42 The same protection was not afforded 
to heterosexual domestic partners owing to the fact that heterosexual domestic partners had 
                                                          
33  Volks par 225. Further see Goldblatt 2003 SALJ 614. 
34  Goldblatt 2003 SALJ 616. 
35  Lind “Domestic partnerships and marital status discrimination” 2005 AJ 108-130. 
36  Heaton “An overview of current legal position regarding heterosexual life partnerships” 2005 
THRHR 662-670. 
37  Lind 2005 AJ 128. 
38  Ibid at 129. 
39  Picarra “Notes and comments: 97 Gory v Kolver 2007 (4) SA” 2007 SAJHR 563-569. 
40  Dawood, Shalabi and Thomas v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC) par 36. 
41   Act 17 of 2006 
42  Heaton Family law 253. See 1.1 above. 
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the choice to marry. They could, therefore, by choice receive the consequences of a 
marriage. The Civil Union Act43 now provides same-sex domestic partners with the same 
choice and they will, therefore, not be entitled to legal protection if the argument in Volks is 
followed.44 The protection provided by the court to same-sex domestic partners, however, 
remains until it is recalled by legislation or altered by a court decision.45  
It would be preferable that heterosexual domestic partners be awarded the same legal 
protection, although it is likely that courts will follow the decision in Volks. It is, however, 
worth noting that in Paxiao v Road Accident Fund,46 the dependant’s action for loss of 
support was recently extended to heterosexual domestic partners.  
1.6  Research methodology 
Research is based on a desktop qualitative study of the relevant literature available, i.e. 
books, case law, journal articles and legislation. The study analyses the relevant South 
African literature critically, particularly in family law.  
1.7  Scope of the study 
In chapter 2, the current regulation of domestic partnerships will be investigated to determine 
whether this provides sufficient protection to domestic partners. In chapter 3, the draft 
Domestic Partnership Bill 36 of 2008 will be analysed to determine the suitability of the draft 
Bill to regulate domestic partnerships. In chapter 4, recommendations will be made with the 
aim of finding solutions to the current insufficient regulation of domestic partnerships. Finally, 
in chapter 5 a conclusion will be reached regarding what should be the preferred approach 
to regulating domestic partnerships. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
43   Act 17 of 2006. 
44  Heaton Family law 253-254.  
45  Gory v Kolver 2007 (4) SA 97 (CC) par 29-30. 
46   2012 (4) All SA (SCA) 130. 
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Chapter 2  
Recognition of domestic partnerships 
2.1  Introduction 
It was mentioned in chapter one that same-sex domestic partners are afforded more spousal 
benefits than heterosexual domestic partners. In this chapter, an analysis will be made of the 
unsatisfactory position which sees the law distinguishing between heterosexual and same-
sex domestic partners. An answer will be provided to the question of what the position 
should be now that same-sex domestic partners can marry. The approach used by courts to 
determine the existence of a domestic partnership will further be discussed. The reasons for 
the existence of domestic partnerships will be investigated. The Constitution has provisions 
that protect human rights, such as the right to equality and the right to human dignity. It will 
be investigated in this chapter whether domestic partnerships are recognised under the 
Constitution. The current regulation of domestic partnerships by legislation and ordinary 
legal remedies will be discussed particularly heterosexual domestic partnerships. 
2.2  The differentiation between same-sex domestic partners and heterosexual 
domestic partners 
Same-sex domestic partners are afforded more spousal benefits than heterosexual domestic 
partners owing to the fact that same-sex domestic partners did not have the choice to marry 
while heterosexual domestic partners have the choice to marry.47 For example, heterosexual 
domestic partners do not have legal protection under the Intestate Succession Act.48 If a 
domestic partner dies without a surviving spouse or children, his or her estate, will accrue to 
his or her blood relations in equal shares, in accordance with the degree of relations to the 
direct line and collateral line.49 As a result of the non-regulation of domestic partnerships 
there are many intestate and property claims that go to the parents or siblings of the 
deceased domestic partner rather than going to a surviving domestic partner.50 If domestic 
partnerships are properly regulated, these intestate and property claims would be inherited 
by surviving domestic partners and there would be less reliance on the public sector. Thus, 
                                                          
47  Heaton Family law 253; Wood-Bodley “Intestate succession and gay and lesbian couples” 
2008 SALJ 46-62.  
48  Act 81 of 1987. 
49  Ss 1(1)(d)-(f) and 4 of the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987.  
50  Schwellnus “Patrimonial consequences of cohabitation in England as basis for legal reform in 
South Africa” 1996 Obiter 42-64). 
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legal recognition could enable domestic partnerships to rely on their partners for social 
support.51 
The benefits of the Intestate Succession Act52 continue to be extended to intimate 
relationships that do not confirm to the traditional concept of marriage: The Constitutional 
Court in Hassim v Jacobs53 declared section 1 of the Intestate Succession Act54 
“inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid to the extent that it does not include more than 
one spouse” in a polygamous Muslim marriage.55 In Daniels v Campbell56 the court 
interpreted the definition of ‘spouse’ in the intestate Succession Act57 to include a spouse to 
a monogamous Muslim marriage.58 In Govender v Ragavayah59 the court held that the word 
‘spouse’ in the Intestate Succession Act60 should be interpreted to include a surviving 
partner in a monogamous Hindu marriage.61 South African family law differentiates between 
civil marriages, same-sex domestic partners, purely religious marriages and heterosexual 
domestic partnerships in a way that places heterosexual domestic partnerships at the bottom 
of the hierarchy for the purpose of intestate succession. It seems that heterosexual domestic 
partners may continue to be denied the benefit of the Intestate Succession Act62 until there 
is legislation that regulates and affords domestic partners invariable consequences of 
marriage.63 In Gory Van Heerden AJ acknowledged that “depending on the nature and 
extent of the statutory dispensation if any, there is a possibility that unmarried heterosexual 
couples will continue to be excluded from the ambit of s 1(1) of the Act”.64  
It has been argued that the preferential treatment afforded to same-sex domestic partners 
should not be taken away because the choice to marry is difficult for same-sex domestic 
partners owing to homophobia in society.65 In terms of section 6 of the Civil Union Act,66 a 
marriage officer may object to solemnise a civil union as a result of being homophobic.67  
                                                          
51  Clark “Families and domestic partnerships” 2002 SALJ 634-648. 
52   Act 81 of 1987. 
53  2009 (11) BCLR 1148 (CC). 
54   Act 81 of 1987. 
55   Par 52. 
56   2004 (5) SA 331 (CC). 
57   Act 81 of 1987. 
58  Par 109. 
59   2009 (3) SA 178 (D). 
60   Act 81 of 1987. 
61  Par 44. 
62   Act 81 of 1987. 
63  Smith and Heaton “Extension of the dependant’s action to heterosexual life partners after 
Volks No v Robinson and the coming into operation of the Civil Union Act-Thus far and no 
further” 2012 THRHR 472-484. 
64  Par 29. 
65  De Ru “A critical analysis of the retention of spousal benefits for permanent same-sex life 
partners after the coming into the operation of the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006” 2009 SJ 111-
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The choice to marry is also difficult on heterosexual domestic partners owing to inequality 
issues in intimate relationships. Kruuse68 argues that when considering the impact of 
homophobia on the free choice to marry for same-sex domestic partners, the law should also 
take into account the lack of free choice to marry by heterosexual domestic partners. The 
preferential treatment of same-sex domestic partners is an infringement of the equality 
clause in the Constitution.69 A solution is needed that will benefit same-sex domestic 
partners and heterosexual domestic partners equally. Heaton70 is of the opinion that the 
benefits extended to same-sex domestic partners should not be taken away, however such 
benefits should also be extended to heterosexual domestic partnerships. Thus heterosexual 
domestic partnerships should be enabled to inherit intestate in terms of the Intestate 
Succession Act.71 Section 1(1) of the Intestate Succession Act72 could be read in to include 
heterosexual domestic partners if a court is approached by a heterosexual domestic partner. 
Smith and Heaton73 notes that extending such benefits to heterosexual domestic partners 
could present an obstacle owing to the implications of the Constitutional Court judgment in 
Volks v Robinson74 Smith75 suggests that the court could be approached to extend such 
benefits on the grounds of unfair discrimination based on sexual orientation rather than 
focusing on the difference between married and unmarried couples. The suggestion of 
Heaton for the extension of the same benefits to heterosexual domestic partners is 
supported in this chapter. The approach that is used to determine the existence of a 
domestic partnership will be analysed in the next paragraph. 
2.3  Determining the existence of a domestic partnership 
South African courts have used marriage as a yardstick to provide spousal benefits to 
domestic partnerships by providing recognition to consequences of domestic partnerships 
that have similar characteristics to marriage.76 Courts tend to focus on whether a domestic 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
126; Wood-Bodley “Same-sex discrimination in employments benefits: Where to now? 2008 
SALJ 483-488; Wood-Bodley “Establishing the existence of a same-sex life partnership for the 
purpose of intestate succession” 2008 SALJ 259-272; De Vos “Same-sex sexual desire and 
the imagining of the South African family” 2004 SAJHR 179-206. 
66   Act 17 of 2006. 
67  De Ru “The Civil Union Act 17 of 2006: A transformative act or a failed conciliation between 
social legal and political issues?” 2010 THRHR 553-568. 
68  Kruuse 2009 SAJHR 386. 
69  Heaton Family law 253-254. 
70  Ibid at 254. 
71   Act 81 of 1987. 
72   Act 81 of 1987. 
73  Smith and Heaton 2012 THRHR 484. 
74   See 1.1 above 
75  Smith “The dissolution of a life or domestic partnership” (JUTA Kenwyn 2014) ed Heaton The 
law of divorce and dissolution of life partnerships in South Africa 389-474. 
76   Du Plessis v Road Accident Fund 2004 1 SA 359 (SCA) par 14 and 42. 
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partnership was similar to marriage or whether domestic partners have expressly or tacitly 
concluded a contract establishing a reciprocal duty of support or whether the domestic 
partnership has a degree of permanence.77 The requirements that the court focus on will be 
discussed in the following paragraph including dependence and monogamy.  
2.3.1 A reciprocal duty of support as requirement for a domestic partnership 
The reciprocal duty of support is an important element of a marriage contract. The duty of 
support is an invariable consequence of marriage and enables spouses to rely on each other 
for accommodation, clothing, food and medical services.78 Upon marriage both spouses will 
no longer rely on their parents or families for the duty of support. The duty of support of 
parents towards the spouses will exists when the need arise.79 Spouses do not need to 
prove the existence of the duty of support owing to the fact that the duty arises by operation 
of law.80 Courts acknowledge the existence of the duty of support in domestic partnerships 
where the partners have undertaken a reciprocal duty of support either tacitly or expressly.81 
In Paxiao the court stated that:  
“Proving the existence of a life partnership entails more than showing that the parties 
cohabited and jointly contributed to the upkeep of the common home. It entails, in my 
view, demonstrating that the partnership is akin to marriage. Its existence would have 
to be proved by credible evidence of a conjugal relationship in which the parties 
supported and maintained each other.”82 
As a result, in Paxiao the court extended the common law dependant’s action for loss of 
support to a heterosexual domestic partnership on the strength that the domestic partners 
had concluded a tacit contract establishing a reciprocal duty of support during the existence 
of their domestic partnership.83 The nature of their domestic partnership was similar to 
marriage. In addition, the fact that there was a joint will between the domestic partners 
                                                          
77  Steynberg and Mokotong “The common law duty of support: Developed and extended to 
include the surviving homosexual partner” 2005 THRHR 330-337. 
78  Sinclair and Heaton The law of marriage 442. 
79  Skelton, Carnelly, Human, Robinson and Smith Family law in South Africa (Oxford University 
Press 2010). 
80  Heaton Family law 46. 
81  Paxiao v Road Accident Fund 2012 4 All SA 130 (SCA) par 20; Du Plessis par 14. Further 
see McDonald where the existence of a joint venture agreement purporting to provide 
financial support to the appellant prevented the inference of a tacit contractual duty of support 
(par 22). 
82  Paxiao par 29. 
83  Par 21. 
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where they made each other sole heirs was taken to be an indication of commitment and 
existence of an agreement by the deceased to maintain the appellant.84  
Case law dealing with domestic partnerships in South African family law has proved that 
being in a domestic partnership alone is not sufficient to receive legal recognition in a 
domestic partnership.85 Domestic partners have to tacitly or expressly establish a reciprocal 
duty of support in order to be afforded recognition. It is argued that a reciprocal duty of 
support was established in Volks but was not recognised by the majority judgment. The court 
acknowledged that the facts of the case made it clear that both partners regarded 
themselves to be in a permanent domestic partnership in which reciprocal duties of support 
were undertaken.86 However, the court emphasised the fact that the domestic partners 
chose not to marry.87  
Smith88 argues that free choice to marry should not play a role when dealing with need 
based claims. Maintenance claims, inheritance claims and the dependant’s action for loss of 
support fall within the category of need based claims. It would be preferable that the 
existence of the duty of support was determined by relying on need based claims. Thus a 
surviving domestic partner such as Mrs Robinson in Volks should receive protection in terms 
of section 2(1) of the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act89 because she needs 
maintenance. The question of whether domestic partners had free choice to marry should 
not be relevant where the duty of support is inferred from the factual existence of a domestic 
partnership.90 The choice argument creates a bar for recognition of many domestic partners 
who do not have free choice to marry owing to social, political and economic reasons. The 
Volks judgment has been criticized by academics.91 Smith92 notes the choice argument may 
still have a role to play. For example, the choice argument can be used where domestic 
partners chose not to marry because they do not want the consequences of marriage. 
However, partners who need maintenance upon termination of a domestic partnership by 
death should be able to receive maintenance provided his or her domestic partner provided 
the maintenance during the domestic partnership. This submission is supported in this study. 
                                                          
84  Par 20-21. 
85   Volks par 3. 
86  Volks par 104. 
87  Volks par 104. 
88  Smith The law of divorce and dissolution of life partnerships in South Africa 424. 
89   Act 27 of 1990. 
90  Smith The law of divorce and dissolution of life partnerships in South Africa 426. 
91  Kruuse 2009 SAJHR 383; Lind 2005 AJ 128; Wildenboer “Domestic partnerships and the 
Constitution: A discussion of Volks v Robinson 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC)” 2005 SAPL 659-
667; Cooke “Heterosexual life partners, death and poverty” 2005 SALJ 542-557.  
92  Smith The law of divorce and dissolution of life partnerships in South Africa 427. 
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It is argued that the court in Volks should have helped Mrs Robinson and other vulnerable 
domestic partners in similar situations who need support.93 The approach taken in Volks is in 
contrast to the one taken in National Coalition where the court had identified circumstances 
where a reciprocal duty of support could be inferred.94 The court in Volks should have 
determined from the facts of the case whether a reciprocal duty of support existed. Such an 
approach would be in line with Satchwell where the court was open to identify the existence 
of a duty of support in a domestic partnership based on the circumstance of such a domestic 
partnership.95 Paxiao focused on whether a reciprocal duty of support had tacitly or 
expressly been established.96 Thus not focusing on whether the domestic partners were free 
to marry.97 This judgment is a more progressive approach than Volks where the 
Constitutional Court shied away from providing solutions to the challenges faced by 
vulnerable domestic partners.98 The Constitutional Court missed an opportunity to develop 
the common law to bring it in line with changing social values.99 An intention to marry should 
not be relevant for recognition of a domestic partnership but proving the existence of a duty 
of support should be an important requirement.100 Even when such duty does not exist by 
operation of the law, nothing stands in the way of domestic partners creating the duty of 
support by contract.101 
2.3.2 A domestic partnership similar to marriage 
Courts have on a number of occasions mentioned that a domestic partnership was similar in 
characteristics to marriage.102 However it is not clear whether this is an important factor in 
determining consequences of a domestic partnership. Steynberg and Mokotong103 argue 
that the requirement that a domestic partnership should be similar to marriage puts a burden 
                                                          
93  Cooke 2005 SALJ 557; Steynberg and Mokotong argue that the requirement to prove a duty 
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96   Para 17-18. 
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102  Paxiao par 29; Du Plessis par 14 and 42; Satchwell par 25.  
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on domestic partnership. In Paxiao the court noted that the reason for extending protection 
to a surviving domestic partner was based on the fact that her domestic partnership 
functioned similar to marriage.104 What the court did was not to diminish the importance 
attached to marriage but to recognize that the benefits afforded to marriage can also be 
extended to other intimate relationships.105 The court seemed to adopt a functional approach 
in Paxiao. This approach of the court is supported in this study. 
2.3.3 Permanence 
It is not clear how long a domestic partnership should exist before partners can be afforded 
legal protection. In Volks domestic partners lived together for a period of 16 years but the 
period was not considered by the court. In Langemaat v Minister of Safety and Security106 
the court stated that same-sex domestic partners who have been in a domestic partnership 
for years while sharing a common home owed each other a duty of support. The court was, 
however, silent on what period may be considered long. In National Coalition the court 
provided a list of factors to determine whether a same-sex domestic partnership was 
permanent which included: the duration of a domestic partnership, whether the partners 
share, lease or own a common residence and the extent to which they share responsibilities 
for living expenses and maintaining of such residence, whether one partner provides 
financial support, medical and other related benefits. The existence of a domestic 
partnership agreement, universal partnership agreement or a will where partners nominate 
each other as heirs could be relevant and could lead a court towards the conclusion that 
domestic partners had the intention to live together permanently.107 
The period of time a domestic partnership exists before being afforded recognition should 
not be important provided the intention of the parties is to enter into a domestic 
partnership.108 Permanence could further apply from the beginning of a permanent domestic 
partnership.109 Wood-Bodley110 argues that it could be unfair discrimination to require a 
longer period for a domestic partnership to exist while a marriage is afforded permanence 
from the day it is concluded. 
Goldblatt111 proposes that courts should have a wider discretion to determine whether a 
domestic partnership existed. Goldblatt112 also lists a number of factors that should aid a 
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court in determining the existence of a domestic partnership. These include: whether 
domestic partners shared a common home; contributed to the maintenance of the common 
home or in the other domestic partner's income; the duration of a domestic partnership or 
whether there were children born of a domestic partnership. Although it might be difficult to 
determine the exact time a domestic partnership came into existence, the above factors will 
help courts to determine the existence of a domestic partnership. The list of factors, 
however, should not be limited to the factors mentioned above and any other relevant factors 
should also be used.113  
This approach is to be supported. It would be preferable for the existence of a domestic 
partnership to be determined on its own facts and merits. It is recommended that, where any 
of the above factors are present, the court should afford legal protection to a domestic 
partnership. The onus should be on the domestic partner claiming the existence of a 
domestic partnership to establish the existence of any of these factors. Where no domestic 
partner or third party argues against the existence of a domestic partnership then such 
domestic partnership should be protected. For example, if X approaches a court to claim 
maintenance from Y on the grounds that X was in a domestic partnership with Y, then Y 
should also be summoned to court to establish whether Y was in a domestic partnership with 
X. If Y does not dispute the existence of a domestic partnership with X, there should not be a 
problem of uncertainty. Where Y disputes the existence of a domestic partnership with X, 
then witnesses, such as neighbours, may be summoned to attest to the existence of such a 
domestic partnership.   
The law, however, should not simply rely on the evidence of the other domestic partner 
where he or she denies the existence of a domestic partnership. A domestic partner might 
claim that he or she lived with the other domestic partner out of generosity and such 
generosity does not constitute a domestic partnership. Functions that are served in a 
domestic partnership should be the guiding factors. Where domestic partners have been 
providing support to each other financially, providing medical expenses, performing 
household duties, such as cleaning, cooking, washing, looking after children, and sharing a 
common home, such conduct should be a positive indication of the existence of a duty of 
support between domestic partners. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
112  Ibid. 
113  Smith The law of divorce and dissolution of domestic partnerships in South Africa 409. 
16 
 
2.3.4 Dependence  
A surviving partner in a domestic partnership can qualify as a “factual dependant” in terms of 
section 1(b)(i) of the Pension Funds Act114 provided the surviving partner establishes that he 
or she and the deceased were mutually dependant or inter-dependent on each other and 
shared a common home with each other while the deceased was alive.115 Thus pension 
funds do not focus on whether a dependant was free to marry when determining whether a 
surviving partner qualifies as a “factual dependent”. Provided the surviving partner can prove 
mutual dependency and the sharing of a common home with the deceased.  
2.3.5 Monogamy  
Courts have not been confronted by a domestic partner in more than one domestic 
partnership or who was involved with a domestic partner who is married to a third party. As a 
result it is unclear whether monogamy is a requirement for affording domestic partnerships 
recognition.116 It is submitted that, a domestic partner should not be denied recognition 
based on the fact that he or she was involved with a partner who was married to a third 
party.117  
It is clear that requirements such as permanence and the existence of a duty of support are 
important in proving the existence of a domestic partnership. The focus should be on these 
requirements although monogamy and dependence may serve as requirements. There are 
many reasons that lead people into domestic partnerships, these reasons will subsequently 
be discussed in the next paragraph. 
2.4  Reasons for the existence of domestic partnerships 
There are many reasons that lead people into domestic partnerships. In Volks, the court 
acknowledged some of the varying circumstances or reasons that lead people to domestic 
partnerships.118 Regardless of the reasons that give rise to the existence of domestic 
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partnerships, the intimate relationships between the domestic partners are important 
because they result in families being created. The Constitutional Court has emphasized the 
importance of the protection of family life.119  
2.4.1 Migration  
Labour migration was a major force in family breakdown before 1994 and it has contributed 
to the increase in domestic partnerships.120 Owing to a lack of work opportunities and 
government policies prior to 1993, many people left their spouses and children behind in 
rural areas to migrate to urban areas where they ended up living for a long time and finding 
new intimate relationships.121 Many of these relationships resulted in domestic partnerships. 
The domestic partner who already had a family might leave the new-partner at any time to 
go back to his or her family.122 Many men who migrated to the cities were normally given 
contracts that kept them away from their families for years and they could see their families 
only for a maximum period of four weeks in a year.123 These men had to live in single sex 
compounds where they became lonely and the situation resulted in extramarital relationships 
which ultimately resulted in domestic partnerships.  
2.4.2 Married persons 
A married spouse may be unwilling to dissolve his or her marriage to avoid a portion of his or 
her assets going to the other spouse owing to their matrimonial property regime.124 A man 
who has a wife in one city may start a domestic partnership with a woman in a different city 
where both domestic partners may share household responsibilities.125  
2.4.3 Poverty and unemployment 
Many women and to a lesser extent men, are forced into domestic partnerships due to 
scarce work opportunities, lack of income and poverty. As a result, they rely on their 
domestic partners for basic needs.126 A domestic partner will continue to be in a domestic 
partnership even when he or she is emotionally or physically abused or when the other 
partner does not have the intention to marry. The material needs of a vulnerable domestic 
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partner will outweigh the abuse suffered by such partner at the expense of a partner in a 
financially stronger position.127  
Poverty and unemployment are a reality for millions of South Africa’s population. It is argued, 
however, that women are affected more by poverty than men.128 Women’s remuneration is 
usually less than that of men in similar positions.129 It is argued that many women are not 
able to run a household on their own as a result of earning lower remuneration than men. 
Such women rely on men to supplement their income and help contribute to the running of 
the household. It is argued that such a situation may result in a domestic partnership based 
on necessity. 
2.4.4 Lobolo 
Men sometimes struggle with the cost of paying lobolo.130 A man willing to deliver lobolo may 
struggle with the amount of lobolo which may result in a delay in formalising an intimate 
relationship.131 Particularly in South African customary law where deliveing lobolo for a bride 
is required by her family. Lobolo is a challenge for many African men owing to the rate of 
unemployment and the high amount that may be asked today.132 A domestic partnership 
becomes an option when a man cannot afford to deliver lobolo or until he can afford to 
deliver lobolo.133 
2.4.5 Ignorance of the law 
There are many men and women who believe that, by living with a partner in a domestic 
partnership for a certain period, the law will automatically afford protection to their domestic 
partnerships.134 These partners expect the same matrimonial benefits as married spouses 
and such partners are shocked when they are not afforded matrimonial benefits upon the 
termination of their domestic partnerships. There is an alarming lack of knowledge as far as 
legal protection of domestic partnerships is concerned.135 
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2.4.6 Blood relations 
Partners in an intimate relationship, who want to marry, may find that they are unable to 
marry due to blood relationships by affinity or consanguinity.136 As a result, domestic 
partnerships become an option for such partners. 
It is clear that there are many reasons for the existence of domestic partnerships than simply 
the free choice of domestic partners to remain unmarried. In most of the instances, the 
parties involved do not have a choice at all to marry but are forced into domestic 
partnerships in order to escape social challenges such as poverty. In many instances, 
therefore, domestic partners are not free to choose their form of commitment. This implies 
that, the choice argument used in Volks should not stand in the way of vulnerable domestic 
partners to be afforded recognition. 
The problem is that domestic partners are not afforded recognition despite compelling 
reasons for the existence of domestic partnerships. The question is whether domestic 
partnerships should not be afforded recognition in light of a Constitution that calls for equal 
treatment for all.137 The Constitution will subsequently be evaluated in the following 
paragraph to determine whether domestic partners can be protected under the Constitution. 
5  The Constitution and domestic partnerships 
2.5.1 The right to equality 
The equality clause found in the Constitution is a notion of sameness and similar treatment 
of everyone which it is argued results in inequality.138 Substantive equality aims at curing 
defects of formal equality. A court acknowledges that inequality arises from power relations 
in society and family relations, and the law has an important role to play in removing social 
inequalities.139 
The problem with formal equality is that it regards people as equal irrespective of their social 
or economic circumstances.140 Formal equality does not make room for difference or 
affirmative action and as a result, people who come from disadvantaged groups of society 
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are treated the same way even if such treatment results in more inequality. Thus the fact that 
inequalities should be eliminated is ignored in the process.141 
Substantive equality is future oriented, as the focus is placed on what can be done to 
remedy inequalities in society.142 It is argued that substantive equality in favour of domestic 
partnerships is needed to address the inequalities of domestic partners as marginalised 
groups in society.143 
In Hugo the court explained that:144  
“We need therefore to develop a concept of unfair discrimination which recognises that 
although a society which affords human being equal worth and freedom is our goal, we 
cannot achieve that goal by insisting upon identical treatment in all circumstances before 
that goal is achieved. Each case therefore will require a careful and thorough understanding 
of the impact of discriminatory action, upon the particular people concerned to determine 
whether its overall impact is one which furthers the constitutional goal of equality or not. A 
classification which is unfair in one context may not necessarily be unfair in a different 
context.” 
Substantive equality was ignored by the court in Volks and it took a backward step at the 
expense of a formalistic approach to law which has no understanding of difference and 
disadvantage in a society characterised by inequality and diversity.145 As a result, the 
decision in Volks has left a legacy that the challenges faced by domestic partners as 
vulnerable family units are not worthy of constitutional protection. It would be preferable if 
substantive equality be applied to domestic partnerships in order to protect vulnerable 
domestic partners.  
Bonthuys146 argues that constitutional principles of equality and rectifying past injustices 
does not allow for western traditions of marriage to define and provide the yardstick for legal 
solutions to problems faced by marginalised groups of South African society. Such a 
continued measure will not achieve much but put “past injustices under the guise of present 
neutrality”. It is argued that the decision in Volks unfairly discriminates against domestic 
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partners and as a result, Volks was incorrectly decided.147 The Volks decision should not be 
accepted owing to the fact that it has set an unfair precedent that the law may fairly 
discriminate between married and unmarried partners.  
Kruuse148 argues that we have to find a way to challenge or soften the doctrine of stare 
decisis. Although such a task will be difficult in light of the fact that Volks was a judgment of 
the Constitutional Court. One of the ways proposed could be for another court to find that the 
majority judgment in Volks erred in its constitutional interpretation and as a result the 
outcome of Volks is incorrect.149 Otherwise domestic partnerships will continue to be 
afforded limited recognition through ordinary legal remedies which are discussed in the next 
paragraph. 
2.5.2 The right to dignity 
The right to dignity is one of the founding values of the Constitution. The constitutional court 
has emphasised that the purpose of the prohibition of unfair discrimination in the interim and 
final Constitution is not only to avoid discrimination against previously disadvantaged people 
(such as domestic partners), but to afford all members of society equal dignity.150 In the past 
domestic partners were affected by the passing of oppressive laws and the dignity of many 
families were infringed.151 The right to dignity is at the heart of the constitutional 
interpretation of other fundamental rights, such as the right to equality and the right to life. 
The right to dignity entails respect and protection for all human beings and the intrinsic 
worth.152 Particularly in light of South Africa’s past where human dignity was derailed by 
oppressive laws.153 
However, in Volks the court argued that the differential treatment of domestic partners does 
not mean that their dignity is less important than that of married spouses.154 The court noted 
that there is a difference between a domestic partnership and a marriage for the purpose of 
maintenance.155 As a result the court will not impose a maintenance obligation on a domestic 
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partner when such obligation was not established during the existence of a domestic 
partnership.156 
It is clear that the right to human dignity is an important right in the Constitution, however it 
seems domestic partners cannot rely on violation of their right to human dignity when they 
are treated differently from civil marriage or customary marriage spouses.  
2.5.3 The right to family life and the right to marry 
The Constitution does not provide for the right to marry nor does it provide for the right to 
family.157 However, many international instruments highlight the importance of marriage and 
family life.158 The duty is imposed on countries such as South Africa which is a signatory to 
these instruments, to ensure that the institution of marriage and family life are protected.159 
The Bill of Rights prohibits unfair discrimination on the ground of marital status and 
recognises that marriages can be concluded under different religious systems or 
traditions.160 The absence of these rights in the South African Constitution is recognition of 
the diverse nature of the South African family law.161  
In terms of article 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:162  
“(1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or 
religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal 
rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. 
(2)  Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending 
spouses. 
(3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to 
protection by society.” 
 
Article 23 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights163 provides: 
“(1) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to 
protection by society and the state. 
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(2)  The right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to found a family 
should be recognised. 
(3)  No marriage shall be entered into without the free and full consent of the intending 
spouses. 
(4) States parties to the present Covenant shall take appropriate steps to ensure 
equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, during marriage 
and at its dissolution. In the case of dissolution, provision shall be made for the 
necessary protection of any children.” 
 
Article 18 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights provides:164 
“(1) The family shall be the natural unit and basis of society. It shall enjoy protection 
and support of the state for its establishment and development. 
(2) The state shall have the duty to assist the family which is the custodian of morals 
and traditional values recognized by the community. 
(3) The state shall ensure the elimination of every discrimination against women and 
also ensure the protection of the rights of women and the child as stipulated in 
international declarations and conventions. 
(4) The aged and the disabled shall also have the rights to special measures of 
protection in keeping with their physical or moral needs.” 
 
It is clear that the above international instruments do not regard marriage as more important 
than the family. The family is regarded as a natural unit and basis of society, it would be 
preferable for South African family law to protect family life as an important social institution 
rather than the institution of marriage.165 South African family law should move away from 
the canon law concepts of marriage that still exist today, which regards marriage as a more 
important institution than other intimate relationships.  
Married and unmarried partners are treated differently in South African family law and 
although it could be argued that the discrimination is unfair, Volks was a judgment of the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa and has established the precedence that the law can 
discriminate between married and unmarried persons for the purpose of matrimonial benefits 
and that such discrimination is not unfair.166 Among the reasons the court provided for its 
reasons for the decision were the importance attached to marriage.167 Secondly, the court 
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refers to the importance of honouring a person’s autonomy to enter into a marriage.168 These 
reasons are regarded as unconvincing and subject to criticism. 
Sinclair and Heaton169 argue that domestic partnerships have co-existed with marriage in 
Roman law for two thousand years without marriage being under any threat of losing its 
value. The law should make marriage more attractive rather than regarding domestic 
partnerships as a reason behind the decline in the conclusion of marriages.  
Meyerson170 questions the purpose of favouring marriage above other intimate relationships 
when such relationships carry the same dependencies, vulnerabilities, similar functions of 
reproduction, child-rearing and mutual commitment to a shared life. Marriage may create 
certainty and a better environment for child rearing while a domestic partnership may be 
seen as morally inferior however, the benefits of formalising an intimate relationship are not 
sufficiently convincing to justify denying recognition to vulnerable domestic partners.171 
Sachs J172 stated that prioritising marriage should not be at the expense of treating other 
intimate relationships as inferior. Voluntariness may not be best served if people are coerced 
into marriage in order to avoid non-recognition of their intimate relationships. Prioritising 
marriage and denying benefits to intimate relationships outside marriage is unlikely to 
encourage such partners to get married. Particularly in a country such as South Africa where 
families are constituted in different forms and the nuclear family is not common.173 
It would be preferable for South African family law to develop a family jurisprudence that 
guarantees and protects liberal constitutional values such as diversity and legal pluralism 
and stop enforcing western traditions of marriage to South African families.174 This is done 
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today for example, with the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act175 while same-sex 
domestic partnerships are able to marry through the Civil Union Act.176 It is argued that the 
problem is that the family has always been seen as an integral part of marriage rather than a 
separate institution. Hence, there is the reluctance to afford protection to intimate 
relationships that fall outside traditional marriage. The time has come for a development of 
an approach that regards family as being more important than marriage in South Africa.177  
Cooke178 notes that the autonomy argument advanced in Volks has merit. The autonomy 
argument acknowledges the fact that there are intimate partners who choose not to marry 
because they do not want the consequences of marriage. However, the autonomy argument 
ignores the fact that there are couples who do not have free choice to marry but are forced 
into domestic partnerships by economic factors.179 Some intimate relationships are one 
sided. A vulnerable partner cannot force the stronger partner to marry and cannot leave 
when the stronger partner is unwilling to marry.180 It is not justified to argue that domestic 
partners have free choice to marry when such circumstances exist.181 In certain cases 
parties have different intentions. One party may be willing to marry while the other party 
could be unwilling to marry.182 Should the law then honour the autonomy of the party who is 
willing to marry but does not have free choice to marry or should the law honour the 
autonomy of the party who is unwilling to marry? What if the party unwilling to marry is in a 
financially and emotionally stronger position while the party willing to marry is in a financially 
and emotionally weaker position to bargain equally in an intimate relationship?183  
Lind184 argues that the approach followed in Volks favours the autonomy of the stronger 
party. He argues that a more appropriate answer to questions about whose autonomy to 
honour should be inferred from the conduct of the parties. Thus functions that are performed 
in a domestic partnership such as mutual support, sharing maintenance obligations and 
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dependence should point towards a willingness to be in a permanent domestic partnership 
worthy of protection by the law. This submission is supported in this study. 
Intimate partners who do not have the autonomy to formalise their intimate relationships 
should be protected even if such protection is at the expense of infringing the autonomy of 
partners who have free choice to marry.185 Inequalities make the choice more difficult.186 It is 
contended that the reasons advanced in Volks to withhold benefits to domestic partners 
should not be used in a country like South Africa. Families should be protected above 
marriage. A domestic partnership that functions similar to marriage should be afforded 
recognition despite the fact that such partnership is not formalised.187 
2.6  Statutory regulation of domestic partnerships 
The application of certain Acts has been extended by case law to apply to domestic 
partnerships.188  
2.6.1 Aliens and Control Act 96 of 1961 
In National Coalition section 25(5) of the Aliens Control Act189 was declared unconstitutional 
owing to the fact that the Aliens and Control Act190 unfairly discriminated against same-sex 
domestic partners on the ground of sexual orientation and marital status.191 Section 25(5) of 
the Aliens Control Act192 granted exemptions to foreign spouses and their dependants while 
excluding same-sex domestic partners from the same benefits. 
2.6.2 Children’s Act 38 of 2005 
Section 21 of the Children’s Act193 provides unmarried fathers with full parental 
responsibilities and rights in respect of children born out of wedlock, if, at the time of the birth 
of the child, the father was living with the mother of the child in a domestic partnership.194 
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This is a welcomed development as, prior to the Children’s Act,195 a father did not have 
parental responsibilities and rights.196 Only the mother had full parental responsibilities and 
rights. The rights and maintenance obligations of parents towards their children are not 
determined with regard to the marital status of parents but with regard to the best interest of 
the child.197  
2.6.3  Compensation for Occupation and Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993 
Sections 1 and 22 of the Compensation for Occupation and Injuries and Diseases Act198 
enables a domestic partner who is dependent on an injured employee to claim 
compensation if the employee is killed in the course of his or her employment.  
2.5.4  Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998 
The Domestic Violence Act199 enables a domestic partner who has been a victim of domestic 
violence to approach a court for a protection order or to open a criminal case where a crime 
has been committed.200  
2.6.5  Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 
Section 6 of the Employment Equity Act201 specifically prohibits unfair discrimination on 
grounds listed in section 9 of the Constitution, including the right not to be unfairly 
discriminated against based on marital status, sexual orientation, family responsibility and 
belief. 
2.6.6  Estate Duty Act 45 of 1955 
The definition of spouse in the Estate Duty Act202 has been amended to include a partner of 
a person in a domestic partnership where the commissioner is satisfied that the domestic 
partnership is intended to be permanent.203 The implication of the amendment of the 
definition of “spouse” is that everything that may accrue to persons identified in the definition, 
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qualify as a deduction in terms of section 4(q) of the Estate Duty Act204 even when they are 
not married. Section 4(q) of the Estate Duty Act205 allows any amount of the surviving 
spouse, whether it is in the form of a donation, life insurance payment or inheritance to be 
deductible in order to arrive at a net value of the estate. 
2.6.7  Immigration Act 13 of 2005 
The definition of ‘spouse’ in section 1 of the Immigration Act206 includes a partner in a 
domestic partnership.207  
2.6.8  Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987 
In Gory the Constitutional Court declared section 1(1) of the Intestate Succession Act208 
unconstitutional owing to the fact that same-sex domestic partners were excluded from 
intestate inheritance from their partner’s deceased estate. The court concluded that the 
exclusion was unfair owing to the fact that same-sex domestic partners could not marry.209 
As a result, section 1(1) of the Intestate Succession Act210 violated the right of same-sex 
domestic partners not to be unfairly discriminated against based on sexual orientation in 
terms of section 9(3) of the Constitution.211 The court stated that, where same-sex domestic 
partners have undertaken reciprocal duties of support, they should be afforded the benefits 
of the Intestate Succession Act212 and failure to do so is a violation of their right to dignity 
and equality.213 The court corrected the unconstitutionality by reading words into section 1(1) 
of the Intestate Succession Act214 to enable same-sex domestic partners protection of the 
Intestate Succession Act.215  
2.6.9  Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act 47 of 2001 
In Satchwell216 sections 8 and 9 of the Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions of Employment 
Act217 were declared unconstitutional because the sections denied a Judge’s same-sex 
domestic partner benefits which are afforded to a Judge’s spouse. The two sections were 
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found to discriminate unfairly against same-sex domestic partners on the grounds of sexual 
orientation and marital status. The same-sex domestic partners had established a 
permanent stable relationship and had undertaken reciprocal duties of support. Spousal 
benefits will not be extended where the parties did not undertake a reciprocal duty of 
support.218 
2.6.10 Maintenance Act 99 of 1998 
The duty of support is an invariable consequence of marriage and obliges married or civil 
partners to support one another, provide food, shelter, clothing, medical and dental 
assistance, as well as other family needs.219 Domestic partners have to establish a duty of 
support by contract to be afforded legal protection in terms of section 2(1) of the 
Maintenance Act.220 For a court to recognise a reciprocal duty of support, the conduct of 
domestic partners must justify an inference that they both consented expressly or by conduct 
to establish a reciprocal duty of support.221 Thus a domestic partner may succeed with a 
maintenance claim during or after termination of a domestic partnership provided there is 
evidence proving the existence of such a duty.222 
2.6.11 Medical Schemes Act 131 of 1998 
Section 1 of the Medical Schemes Act223 includes a domestic partner as a dependant. Any 
dependant or immediate family member of a domestic partner is, thus, afforded protection 
under the Medical Schemes Act.224 Section 24(1)(e) states that the scheme will not unfairly 
discriminate against anyone on forbidden grounds and these include gender, marital status 
and social origin.  
2.6.12 Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956 
Section 1 of the Pension Funds225 Act includes domestic partners under the definition of 
“spouse”. In terms of section 37C(1) of the Pension Funds Act,226 a pension fund may, within 
twelve months of the deceased’s death, award a death benefit to a dependant of a domestic 
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partner provided the benefit did not form part of the deceased’s estate or was not regulated 
by the Intestate Succession Act.227  
2.6.13 Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996 
A domestic partner can institute a claim for maintenance or alternatively for loss of support. 
in terms of section 17(1) of the Road Accident Fund Act,228 where his or her partner dies or 
suffer serious bodily injury arising from an accident caused by the wrongful act or negligent 
driving “by a driver or owner of the motor vehicle or of his or her employee in the 
performance of the employees duties as employee” who is insured by the Fund or agent 
should the motor vehicle accident occur within the Republic of South Africa.  
The surviving partner must first prove that the deceased supported him or her while the 
deceased was still alive,  secondly, that the fund, as a third party, is bound by the deceased 
agreement to support the surviving partner or that the agreement is worthy of protection by 
the law.229  
It is clear that certain Acts afford domestic partners recognition. However, recognition 
through such Acts is not sufficient. These Acts were not promulgated with the purpose of 
regulating domestic partnerships. There are areas of domestic partnerships which are not 
covered by the above Acts, such as the right of a domestic partner to occupy the common 
home and domestic partners also do not have legal protection in terms of the Maintenance 
of Surviving Spouses Act.230 Other legal remedies affording recognition to domestic partners 
will be discussed in the next paragraph. 
2.7  Ordinary legal remedies available to domestic partnerships 
2.7.1  Contract 
2.7.1.1 Universal partnership 
Domestic partners can tacitly or expressly enter into a contract to create a universal 
partnership.231 Each one of the domestic partners must undertake to contribute their skill, 
labour or money or bind them to contribute something into the partnership. The universal 
partnership must benefit both partners and the intention of each partner should be to make a 
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profit. Furthermore, the universal partnership contract should be created with a legitimate 
purpose, thus not be contrary to public policy or the law.232  
A universal partnership agreement does not have to be in writing as the court can infer from 
the conduct of the contracting partners whether they intended a universal partnership to 
exist.233 After entering into an agreement, the universal partnership becomes a joint 
undertaking and neither of the domestic partners may contract with a third party without the 
consent of both partners. The termination of the universal partnership will be regulated by 
the partners’ contract. The universal partnership will be regulated by the law of partnerships 
in the absence of an agreement by the partners. 
In V (also known as L) v De Wet234 a domestic partner was awarded half of the estate of the 
combined assets in the universal partnership. The partners had been in a domestic 
partnership for a period of 21 years. The woman had contributed to the commercial 
undertaking by raising children and doing domestic duties, she had also worked in the man’s 
business enterprise.  
In Butters v Mncora235 the Supreme Court of Appeal found that a tacit universal partnership 
had been established in a domestic partnership that had existed for twenty years and the 
court awarded the female partner a thirty per cent share of the universal partnership 
estate.236 Despite the fact that the female partner had not made a direct contribution to the 
commercial undertaking, it was sufficient that she had supported the male partner, 
maintained their home and cared for their children during the period of their domestic 
partnership. Thus the non-commercial contributions of a partner are taken into account when 
determining a partner’s entitlement in the partnership.237  
The societas universam bonorum is an example of a family law universal partnership where 
parties agree to share all present and future profits acquired from commercial undertakings 
or non-profit undertakings.238 All the movable and immovable property each partner had at 
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the beginning of an intimate relationship will become the property of the universal 
partnership, including inheritances, gifts and donations.239 However a property can be 
excluded from the universal partnership where a party acquired the property on condition 
that it will not form part of a universal partnership.240 
Mncora extended the limited remedies domestic partners have and affords them an 
opportunity to claim the financial benefits of a universal partnership even when they did not 
directly contribute to accumulating such financial benefits. A court will infer the existence of a 
universal partnership where it is more probable that the parties tacitly concluded such a 
contract.241 This is a progressive step for domestic partnerships after the “narrow approach” 
adopted by the majority judgment in Volks.242 
2.7.1.2 Domestic partnership contract 
Domestic partners can enter into a domestic partnership contract and make provision for 
maintenance during and after the termination of their domestic partnership. This can include: 
who is to occupy the partners’ joint home during and after the death of one partner, who will 
make a contribution to the assets of their estate or who will be in possession of the partners’ 
property.243 Domestic partners moreover, can make provision with regard to the role and 
responsibilities of each partner during the continuation of their domestic partnership. A 
domestic partnership contract enables partners to make provision to have most of the rights 
and responsibilities similar to those of married spouses.244  
A domestic partnership agreement has to be in writing, signed and witnessed either by the 
parties or a representative of the domestic partners.245 The contract is only enforceable 
between the partners. Such a contract should not be immoral, it is however, not immoral for 
two partners to be in a domestic partnership. However a court is unlikely to enforce such a 
contract where a man offers to pay a woman for the woman to agree to leave with the man 
as his mistress.246 The situation could be different where the man remunerates the woman 
for work the woman does as the man’s secretary for instance, while they are in a domestic 
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partnership.247 A domestic partnership contract may also be found to be against public policy 
and unenforceable where one of the parties in a domestic partnership is married to a third 248 
party and is being sued.249 Although a domestic partnership may be declared void for 
immorality. Heaton250 argues that in light of the increasing recognition of domestic 
partnerships, a contract regulating consequences of a domestic partnership should not be 
declared contrary to public policy for immorality reasons. 
2.7.2 Testate succession 
Domestic partners have the option of concluding a will in which they can nominate each 
other as heirs.251 A married domestic partner may even exclude his or her spouse from 
inheritance in favour of his or her domestic partner. However a domestic partner should be 
clear in his or her intention to nominate the other domestic partner as a beneficiary.252 In 
McDonald,253 the respondent was in a domestic partnership with the appellant and made 
provisions for financial support of the appellant in a series of wills. While in Paxiao the 
deceased executed a will in which he nominated himself and his domestic partner as sole 
heirs of their entire estate upon the death of either one of them.254 
2.7.3 Unjustified enrichment 
Smith255 notes that there is not yet explicit authority where unjustified enrichment claims 
have been afforded for the benefits of domestic partnerships. However he also notes that in 
theory such claims can be recognised at the expense of an impoverished domestic partner. 
An example would be where a domestic partner was financially dependent on another 
partner while rendering services to that partner. The dependent partner could succeed with 
an enrichment claim if he or she was unjustly impoverished at the expense of his or her 
partner.256 A domestic partner could also succeed with the claim where they jointly bought a 
house or opened a business but the house or business was registered in the name of one 
partner. An impoverished partner could use the action to be compensated for being unjustly 
impoverished if he or she is kicked out of the house or denied the benefits of the business.257 
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A court could be reluctant to award the claim to a domestic partner where the claim is 
uncertain or is not clear.258 
2.7.4 Estoppel 
Where a domestic partner represents himself or herself as being married to third parties, the 
domestic partner will be estopped from escaping liability against third parties when it later 
becomes known that he or she is not married.259 A domestic partner could rely on estoppel 
as a defence where the partner was led to believe that he or she has acquired a legal right 
over property if this information is not correct, provided the domestic partner acted to his or 
her detriment.260 If a domestic partner represents him or herself as an agent of the other 
domestic partner to a third party, the third party could use estoppel to prevent the domestic 
partner from escaping liability. Both domestic partners are treated similar to married spouse 
for the purpose of estoppel.261  
2.7.5 The dependant’s action for loss of support 
The dependant’s action for loss of support is not available to everyone who intends to 
institute a claim for loss of support. It does not automatically afford protection to heirs, 
contracting parties or immediate family members of the deceased.262 There should be a 
legal duty of support before the law extends the duty of support to domestic partners.263 A 
surviving domestic partner will be able to claim the dependant’s action for loss of support 
provided that he or she can prove the existence of a legal duty of support between the 
deceased and the surviving partner while the deceased was still alive.264 
Verheem v Road Accident Fund265 was the first case in South African law which found that a 
contractual duty of support between heterosexual domestic partners had been well 
established and is legally enforceable.266 The plaintiff had the required locus standi to claim 
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a dependant’s action for loss of support against the defendant, however, the Judge did not 
grant the claim to the plaintiff.267 Although this case is welcomed with positivity as the Judge 
found the undertaking by the deceased to constitute a duty of support between the two 
domestic partners, it is argued that this case was incorrectly decided as the plaintiff was not 
seeking the recognition of an ex lege duty of support in the context of heterosexual domestic 
partners but for the extension of the common law dependant’s action for loss of support to 
heterosexual domestic partners.268 Furthermore, it is argued that the plaintiff should have 
been awarded the dependant’s action for loss of support by Goodey AJ due to the fact that a 
dependant’s action for loss of support is completely different to a maintenance claim that 
was argued for in Volks.269  
The Supreme Court of Appeal in Paxiao decided that Volks does not prevent the extension 
of the dependant’s action for loss of support to heterosexual domestic partners.270 The court 
then extended the dependant’s action for loss of support to heterosexual domestic 
partners.271 Paxiao is an important case for heterosexual domestic partners. Prior to Paxiao, 
the dependant’s action for loss of support was not extended to heterosexual domestic 
partners. Thus Paxiao removed the distinction between heterosexual domestic partners and 
same sex domestic partners for the purpose of the dependant’s action for loss of support.272  
2.7.6 Constructive trust 
A domestic partner can create a constructive trust. The intention of the founder should 
expressly state that he or she aims to create a trust for the benefit of the other partner. 
Should the intention to create a trust not be clear, it may be difficult for the court to find that a 
trust was established by one or both partners.273 Constructive trusts are common in Anglo-
American law, however in South Africa there is not enough scope for the application of 
constructive trusts, particularly where the intention to create a trust is not clear.274 Despite 
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the lack of scope dealing with trusts in South Africa, one or both domestic partners may 
create a trust with a clear intention to nominate either or both partners as beneficiaries.275 
2.7.7 Insurance 
Domestic partners may nominate each other as beneficiaries under a life insurance policy. It 
will, however, have to be clear in the nomination clause that a benefit is being conferred to a 
partner as a “family member” of the policy holder.276  
2.7.8 Joint bank account 
Domestic partners are not allowed to open a joint bank account. Domestic partners can use 
a bank account opened by one of the partners. The non-account holder will, however, have 
limited rights to the account. The non-account holder will have to rely on the account holder 
to access overdraft facilities or to fund the account since the account holder will be the only 
one with signing powers over the account.277 
It is clear from the above that only piecemeal recognition is provided to domestic 
partnerships through legislation, case law and the application of ordinary legal principles by 
the domestic partnerships themselves.  
2.8  Preliminary conclusion 
Comments have been made in this chapter about the lack of proper regulation of domestic 
partnerships. The Constitutional Court has been approached in the hope that the court will 
help vulnerable domestic partners who need protection during and upon termination of their 
domestic partnerships. The Constitutional Court, however, has ruled that domestic 
partnerships should not be afforded the same legal consequences as marriage. Where does 
the hope lie for domestic partnerships if the Constitutional Court has reached a decision that 
discriminating between married and unmarried couples does not amount to unfair 
discrimination? The solution has to be based on how a domestic partnership functions. 
There should not be a distinction between married and unmarried couples. Courts should 
recognise the existence of a duty of support from the facts of every case by relying on how a 
domestic partnership functioned during its existence. Free choice to marry should not have 
any role to play in determining recognition of a domestic partnership. A draft Bill has been 
proposed with the purpose of regulating domestic partnerships. In the next chapter, the draft 
Bill will be analysed to determine its suitability to regulate domestic partnerships. 
                                                          
275  Smith LLD thesis UFS 389. 
276  Sinclair and Heaton The law of marriage 290. 
277  Schwellnus “The legal position of cohabitees in the South African law” 1995 Obiter 133-157. 
37 
 
Chapter 3  
The draft Domestic Partnerships Bill 
3.1  Introduction 
It was stated in the previous chapter that there is no dedicated legislation that specifically 
regulates domestic partnerships. As a result domestic partners have to rely on ordinary legal 
remedies to regulate their partnerships. In this chapter, the draft Domestic Partnership Bill 
will be analysed to determine the suitability of the draft Bill to regulate domestic partnerships. 
Attention will be paid to the criticism of the draft Bill and the hierarchy of intimate 
relationships in South African family law.278 
There are currently only three forms of intimate relationships in South Africa that are 
regulated by legislation: Civil marriages regulated by the Marriage Act,279 customary 
marriages regulated by the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act280 and same-sex 
domestic partnerships regulated by the Civil Union Act.281 
The Civil Union Bill,282 which appeared in Government Gazette 29169 of 31 August 2006, 
had a chapter regulating domestic partnerships. Owing, however, to the fact that the one 
year deadline for the promulgation of the Civil Union Act283 was looming, the chapter 
regulating domestic partnerships was dropped by parliament from the final draft Civil Union 
Bill which was eventually promulgated as the Civil Union Act.284 
In 2008, the draft Domestic Partnership Bill appeared in the Government Gazette.285 The 
objective of the draft Bill is to afford protection to the legal rights, status and interests of 
domestic partners.286 The draft Domestic partnership Bill, as it appeared in the Government 
Gazette, was similar to chapter three of the first Civil Union Bill GG 29169 of 31 August 
2006. 
The SALRC’s rationale in making proposals for legal reform to domestic partnerships was to 
create an alternative to marriage and make family law more accessible to vulnerable 
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domestic partners and affordable to indigent people.287 The draft Domestic Partnership Bill 
aims to provide domestic partners with some of the rights, benefits and obligations similar to 
those afforded to spouses in civil marriages. Upon registration, domestic partners will be 
afforded most of the consequences of a civil marriage.288 
The draft Bill proposes a two-tier system of regulation which distinguishes between 
registered domestic partnerships regulated by chapter three of the draft Bill and unregistered 
domestic partnerships regulated by chapter 4 of the draft Bill. Consequently the 
requirements for registering a domestic partnership in terms of the draft Bill will be discussed 
below. 
3.2  Requirements for registering a domestic partnership 
3.2.1  Registration age 
Only persons who are 18 years or older can register a domestic partnership.289 As a result a 
person under the age of 18 will not be able to register a domestic partnership even when 
such a person is assisted by a parent or guardian. The position is similar with that of minors 
who want to contract a civil union in terms of the Civil Union Act.290 A minor is allowed to 
contract a civil marriage or customary marriage with the necessary consent but this is not 
possible under the draft Bill.291 This violates the equality clause. The Constitution prohibits 
unfair discrimination on the ground of age.292  
                                                          
287  SALRC (2006) 6.2.22. The SALRC further mentioned the need for striking a balance between 
the interests of emotionally and financially weaker partners who need legal protection and 
protecting the autonomy of partners who prefer not to formalise their domestic partnerships. In 
addition, provision had to be made for family units which are made up of care givers who 
provide services and benefits to vulnerable members of the family without remuneration for 
their services. Such families also need legal recognition (SALRC (2006) 1.3.6). However care-
givers fall outside the scope of this study and will not be discussed.  
288  CL 9-11; Bakker 2013 PELJ 133-134. 
289  Cl 6. 
290   Act 17 of 2006. 
291  Ss 24(1) and (2) of the Marriage Act 25 of 1961, read with s 18(3)(c) and (5) of the Children’s 
Act 38 of 2005, enables a minor to enter into a civil marriage provided the minor obtains the 
consent of his or her parent or guardian. The only exception to s 24 is when a minor under the 
age of 18 years has already entered into a marriage that was dissolved by death or divorce. In 
addition s 3 of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 enables a minor to 
enter into a customary marriage provided the minor is granted written consent by the Minister 
of Home Affairs where the child could not obtain consent from his or her parent, guardian or 
alternatively could not use section 25 of the Marriage Act 25 of 1961 which enables a 
Commissioner of Child Welfare to grant written consent to the minor, approving the marriage 
of the minor. A minor may approach the High Court for consent in terms of s 25(4) of the 
Marriage Act 25 of 1961 where the parents, guardian or commissioner of child welfare refuse 
to consent to the civil marriage of the minor. In addition, s 26(1) of the Marriage Act 25 of 
1961 enables a boy under the age of 18 and a girl under the age of 15 to marry with the 
written consent of the Minister of Home Affairs provided the Minister is satisfied that the 
marriage is desirable. The Minister also has the authority to ratify the marriage of a minor, 
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A minor who has already concluded a civil marriage or customary marriage will not need 
consent to enter into another marriage where the first marriage was dissolved by death or 
divorce.293 The draft Bill is silent on whether a minor who has attained the age of majority 
through entering a civil or customary marriage can register a domestic partnership upon the 
dissolution of the civil or customary marriage.  
It is clear that the draft Bill makes civil and customary marriages the only vehicles for minors 
to attain the age of majority. It would be preferable for minors to be enabled to register a 
domestic partnership.294 Consequently the citizenship of prospective domestic partners will 
be discussed in the next paragraph. 
3.2.2  Citizenship  
A registered domestic partnership between two foreign partners will not be allowed. One of 
the partners should at least be a South African citizen.295 The draft Bill does, however not 
contain a provision that requires either of the two registering domestic partners to produce 
an identification document or an affidavit which could help the registration officer to establish 
the nationality of prospective partners. Section 12 of the Marriage Act296 prohibits the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
where a minor under the age of 15, enters into a civil marriage without the required consent of 
the Minister and the Minister believes the marriage is in the best interests of the minor, 
provided the marriage complies with the other provisions of the Marriage Act 25 of 1961. 
292  S 9; De Ru 2010 THRHR 561-562. Further see s 1 of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 which 
defines a child as someone who is under the age of 18 years and makes no reference to 
differential treatment. 
293  S 24(2) of the Marriage Act 25 of 1961. 
294  Art 18 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990) states that children 
should not be discriminated against based on sexual orientation, marital status, social, 
economic grounds or any other grounds. Art 4 of the United Nations Conventions on the 
Rights of the Child (1989) states that children should be afforded equal rights irrespective of 
their conditions or social circumstances. Further see Muller and Tait “The best interest of 
children: A criminal law concept?” (1999 De Jure 323-329 in this regard). International 
instruments require the best interests of the child to be of paramount importance when 
implementing marriageable age or regulating child law (UN General Assembly, Convention on 
Consent, Minimum Age and Registration of Marriages (1962). Further see art 16(1) of the 
United Nation’s Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(1979) which also requires the best interest of the child to be of paramount when dealing with 
child law. S (1) of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 has laid down guidelines to be used to assist 
family law in ascertaining what qualifies as being in the best interest of the child and s 28 of 
the Constitution regards the best interest of the child as paramount (Sloth Nielsen “Ratification 
of the United Nations Convention on the rights of the child: Some implications for South 
African Law” 1995 SAJHR 401-420). S 7(1) of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005, however, does 
not state under which circumstances such factors will be considered or regarded as relevant 
factors (Heaton Family law 165). South African family law should honour duties imposed by 
international instruments (Ibid at 163-164).  
295  Cl 4(6). 
296   Act 25 of 1961. 
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solemnization of any marriage without the prospective spouses producing an identification 
document or prescribed declaration.297  
It would be preferable that the draft Bill also makes the production of an identity document or 
an affidavit compulsory prior to registering a domestic partnership. Producing an identity 
document or affidavit could help the court to ascertain the citizenship and the age of 
prospective domestic partners where a registration officer is uncertain about the citizenship 
or age of prospective partners.298  
3.2.3  Registration of a domestic partnership 
Registration is a requirement for a valid registered domestic partnership.299 The registration 
process is overseen by the Minister of Home Affairs or his or her duly authorised 
representative.300 Registration officers are appointed from within the ranks of officers or 
employees in the public, diplomatic or consular service of the Republic of South Africa.301 
The registration of a domestic partnership is completed by partners in writing in front of a 
registration officer.302  
It is uncertain whether a domestic partnership will be afforded the same consequences of a 
registered domestic partnership or whether it will be regarded as an unregistered domestic 
partnership where one of the requirements of registration was not fulfilled or the registration 
of a domestic partnership was defective. It would be preferable that a domestic partnership 
is afforded postnuptial registration provided that domestic partners can prove that they tried 
to register their domestic partnership earlier. 
Upon registration of a domestic partnership, domestic partners will be furnished with a 
registration certificate as proof of the existence of their domestic partnership. This is a 
positive step as it signifies a public commitment and creates a formal status.  
Registered domestic partners will have the option of concluding a domestic partnership 
agreement.303 The agreement will have the same validity as an ante-nuptial contract against 
                                                          
297  S 7 of the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 which requires the prospective spouses also to produce 
an identity document or an affidavit before a civil union is concluded. 
298  S 5(2) of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 empowers a registration 
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third parties notwithstanding that the agreement will not be attested by a notary or registered 
in the deeds office.  
It is clear that the registration process of a domestic partnership is formal and domestic 
partners will further receive a registration certificate upon registration. The draft Bill however 
prohibits registration of certain domestic partnerships. Such domestic partnerships will be 
discussed in the next paragraph. 
3.2.4  Married domestic partners and polygamous domestic partnerships 
A person who has already concluded a civil marriage, customary marriage or a civil union 
will be prohibited from registering a domestic partnership.304 The draft Bill makes it clear 
which domestic partners will be prohibited from registering their domestic partnerships. It 
further seems that such partners will not be afforded recognition in terms of chapter 4 of the 
draft Bill as unregistered domestic partners.305 Smith306 notes that clauses 4(2) and 26(4) are 
under-inclusive and could cause certain predicaments. For instance, partners in purely 
religious marriages are not included amongst domestic partners who are prohibited from 
registering a domestic partnership.307 Thus it is unclear whether registration of a domestic 
partnership between a Muslim or Hindu marriage partner and a domestic partner will be 
recognised as a registered domestic partnership. Nor is it clear whether such a domestic 
partnership can be recognised as an unregistered domestic partnership. In light of the 
silence of the draft Bill, it can be concluded that such domestic partnerships may be afforded 
recognition. Smith308 proposes an amendment to clause 4 of the draft Bill making it clear that 
the aim of the draft Bill is not to regulate purely religious marriages. He argues that this 
amendment can ensure that all registered domestic partnerships will be monogamous.309  
It is clear that the draft Bill only intends to afford recognition to monogamous domestic 
partnerships. This is made clear in the case of a party who is already married or has 
registered a domestic partnership.310 It seems, however, that unregistered domestic partners 
are not prohibited to be in polygamous domestic partnerships.311 Clause 26(4) empowers the 
                                                          
304  Cl 4(2). 
305  Cl 26(4). 
306  Smith LLD thesis UFS 504; Smith 2011 SALJ 586-587.  
307  Cl 4(2) and Cl 26(4). A partner married in accordance with a Muslim or Hindu religious system 
can also be involved in an unregistered domestic partnership with a third party with the result 
that the unregistered domestic partnership will be afforded the remedies provided in chapter 4 
(Smith 2011 SALJ 587). 
308  Ibid at 587-588; Smith LLD thesis UFS 505. 
309  Ibid at 506. 
310  Cl 4(1)-(2) and 26(4). 
311  Cl 28(2)(h) empowers the court to take into account the circumstances of another 
unregistered domestic partnership when ordering the payment of maintenance order to an 
existing domestic partnership. 
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court not to make an order in terms of chapter 4 where one of the parties to a registered 
domestic partnership is already a spouse in a civil marriage or union. Clause 26(4) is 
however silent on whether a court can make an order in terms of chapter 4 where a spouse 
in a customary marriage is also a partner in an unregistered domestic partnership with a 
third party. It is argued that clause 26(4) may encourage multiple unregistered domestic 
partnerships between customary marriages spouses and third parties. If the court were to 
award an order to the third party in terms of chapter 4, it may open the possibility for 
conflicting claims from a number of surviving partners upon termination of an unregistered 
domestic partnership. Who could allege, for instance, that they were in an unregistered 
domestic partnership with the deceased and are, therefore, entitled to an intestate 
succession order. This predicament can be resolved by including customary marriage 
spouses in clause 26(4). This measure would ensure that most unregistered domestic 
partnerships are monogamous and the court may not award an order where they are not.  
3.2.5  Prohibited degrees of relationship 
Domestic partners in the prohibited degrees of consanguinity and affinity similar to that of 
civil marriages will be prohibited from registering a domestic partnership.312 The prohibited 
degrees of relationship however, do not apply in the case of unregistered domestic partners 
and this is a serious shortcoming in the draft Bill.313  
Consanguinity may thus, occur in the direct line between ascendants and descendants. A 
father and his daughter can enter into a domestic partnership. Two people who are related to 
each other in the collateral line and share a common ancestor such as an uncle and his 
niece would be able to claim protection under the draft Bill as unregistered domestic 
partners.314  
It would be preferable for registered and unregistered domestic partnerships to be treated 
equally for the purpose of the prohibited degrees of relationship. The prohibited degrees of 
relationship should also apply to unregistered domestic partnerships.315 An unregistered 
domestic partnership which violates the prohibited degrees of relationship should be 
declared void. As a result, no remedy should be afforded to unregistered domestic partners 
who violate prohibited degrees of relationship while aware of such violation. 
It is clear that the prohibited degrees of relationship may be violated in the case of 
unregistered domestic partners and such partners may be afforded any of the remedies in 
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chapter 4. Violating prohibited degrees of relationship may have serious consequences for 
registered domestic partners and children born of such domestic partnerships. In the next 
paragraph, the consequences of violating the prohibited degrees of relationship and of non-
compliance with registration formalities will be discussed. 
3.2.6  Void and voidable domestic partnerships 
The draft Bill is silent on the consequences of defective registration. Should registration of a 
domestic partnership be defective, the domestic partnership may be classified as an 
unregistered domestic partnership and will not have the consequences of a registered 
domestic partnership. 316 The non-owner of the family home will not have the right to occupy 
the family home, with the result that he or she may be evicted. The draft Bill offers no 
recourse for the non-owner. The draft Bill is silent on whether defective registration may be 
ratified. It is uncertain what the position would be in cases where the defective registration 
was made in good faith and all other formalities were followed.317  
A civil marriage can be rendered voidable in certain circumstances, such as where a minor 
fails to obtain the necessary consent from his or her parents or legal guardian.318 A voidable 
civil marriage has all the legal consequences of a civil marriage and remains in force until it 
is set aside by the court.319 The status of a child born from a voidable civil marriage is not 
affected by an annulment order.320 It would be preferable for the draft Bill to make provision 
for voidable domestic partnerships to protect the interests of children and innocent domestic 
partners who may not be aware of the presence of a defect when a domestic partnership is 
registered. 
The draft Bill should draw a distinction between void and voidable registered domestic 
partnerships. Where a domestic partnership is void owing to a lack of formal requirements, 
such as a defective registration, the registration of the domestic partnership should be 
ratified by the court, Minister of Home Affairs or anyone duly authorised by the Minister of 
Home Affairs. There should also be a solution to circumstances where one or both partners 
are not aware during registration that there is a defect that renders their registration void. A 
solution to defective registration will be discussed in the next paragraph. 
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3.2.6.1 The putative marriage principle 
Smith321 is of the opinion that the solution to void registered domestic partnership should be 
found in the putative marriage principle. A putative marriage exists when there is a defect 
that renders a civil marriage void, however one or both parties to the marriage were not 
aware of the defect.322 A putative marriage is not a valid marriage but can have some of the 
consequences of a valid marriage despite being void. Provided parties entered into the void 
marriage in good faith and all the formalities were adhered to when the marriage was 
solemnised.323 The purpose of the putative marriage principle is to save innocent parties 
from the consequences of declaring a marriage void particularly where children are 
involved.324 A putative marriage will be in community of property if both parties acted in good 
faith when concluding the putative marriage.325 Provided both parties did not conclude an 
ante-nuptial contract when concluding the marriage. The putative marriage may still be in 
community of property even when it is only one party who acted in good faith if the court 
believes treating the marriage to be in community of property will benefit the innocent 
party.326 A party who acts in good faith may claim half of the joint estate where community of 
property was excluded by an ante-nuptial contract when entering into the marriage.327 
The putative marriage principle has not been applied to cases dealing with domestic 
partnerships in South Africa. Smith328 notes this is caused by the lack of legislation 
regulating domestic partnerships. He submits that the law should treat registered domestic 
partnerships and civil marriage similar despite the significance attached to marriage. He 
points out that a registered domestic partnership is a formal and public commitment with 
similar legal consequences to a civil marriage. As a result, the putative marriage principle 
should also be extended to registered domestic partners who act in good faith when 
registering a domestic partnership that is void owing to a defect in registration.329 A void 
domestic partnership will have no legal status despite the fact that the domestic partners 
acted in good faith.  
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The distinction between registered and unregistered domestic partners is also important 
under the draft Bill for the purpose of children born of a registered domestic partnership.330 In 
terms of clause 16 of the draft Bill, the court may not order the termination of a registered 
domestic partnership where termination is not in the best interests of children born of a 
registered domestic partnership. Clause 17 affords a father of a child born of a registered 
domestic partnership parental rights and responsibilities similar to a father with minor 
children born from a civil marriage. Where a registered domestic partnership is declared void 
due to non-compliance with formal requirements, the father’s rights and responsibilities in 
terms of clause 17 will not automatically vest. The father will have to rely on section 21(1) of 
the Children’s Act331 to be afforded parental responsibilities and rights.332 The application of 
the putative marriage principle can help children from the consequences of declaring a 
registered domestic partnership void. Smith’s submissions are supported in this study. It is 
recommended that the putative marriage principle should be applied in cases of void 
registered domestic partnerships, to protect partners who act in good faith when they 
register a domestic partnership.  
The application of the patrimonial consequences of the putative marriage principle to 
domestic partners, however, could be a problem to domestic partners owing to the fact that 
the default system proposed in the draft Bill is out of community of property. Smith333 argues 
that the fact that a civil marriage has a different default property regime to the one proposed 
in the draft Bill does not mean the putative marriage principle cannot be applied to registered 
domestic partnerships. The application of the putative marriage principle depends on the 
intention of the parties and a formal and public commitment or ceremony. The conclusion of 
a registered domestic partnership is also performed in a formal and public ceremony.334 He 
submits that, although the default system proposed in the draft Bill is out of community of 
property, registered domestic partners should still be afforded the same legal consequences 
they would have been entitled to if the registration was valid.335 Thus an existing registered 
domestic partnership agreement between the two parties should still be honoured. 
It is clear that the putative marriage principle can be a solution to the consequences of a void 
registered domestic partnership, particularly where children are involved. It was also argued 
in the above paragraph that the property regime proposed in the draft Bill should not be a 
deterrent to the application of the putative marriage principle to registered domestic 
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partnerships. Legal rights and obligations can still be enforced between registered domestic 
partners and any agreement concluded by the parties such as a universal partnership or a 
domestic partnership agreement can still be enforced. Universal community of property may 
make application of the putative marriage principle easier. It will be argued in the next 
paragraph that the default system in the draft Bill should be in community of property. 
3.2.7  Property regime 
The proposed default property regime in the draft Bill is out of community of property while 
the default property regime in civil marriages, customary marriages and civil unions is in 
community of property.336 The rationale of the SALRC was to create a simple and less 
complicated property regime that will be understood by registering domestic partners. 
Registering domestic partners can conclude a registered domestic partnership agreement to 
regulate the patrimonial consequences of their partnership.337  
When civil marriage spouses do not conclude an ante-nuptial contract, the patrimonial 
consequences of their marriage are automatically regulated through the universal community 
of property.338 Universal community of property will not automatically vest in registered 
domestic partnerships.339 This is an unsatisfactory position for domestic partners who may 
not be able to conclude a registered domestic partnership agreement owing to, for example, 
financial constraints, despite the fact that a registered domestic partnership agreement might 
be more cost effective than an ante-nuptial contract. The option of concluding a registered 
domestic partnership agreement should be kept since it costs less and is as effective as an 
ante-nuptial contract. It is, however, recommended that the universal community of property 
should automatically apply to registered domestic partners where they do not conclude a 
registered domestic partnership agreement.  
Universal community of property is not complicated and partners who register a domestic 
partnership should not have a problem understanding the fact that they will have equal 
powers of management of a joint estate, should they not register a domestic partnership 
agreement.340 Domestic partners should be informed how universal community of property 
operates when they register their domestic partnership. The only difference should be that 
civil marriage spouses will sign an ante-nuptial contract where they want to deviate from the 
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universal community of property, while registering domestic partners may deviate from the 
universal community of property by concluding a domestic partnership agreement.  
A default system out of community of property will also not benefit domestic partners who 
cannot financially afford the additional cost of effecting a domestic partnership agreement on 
top of the cost of registering a domestic partnership.341 Registered domestic partners who do 
not bring property to the domestic partnership or cannot afford to register a domestic 
partnership agreement will, thus, not be afforded legal protection while spouses in civil 
unions, civil and customary marriages will be afforded automatic protection in terms of the 
Matrimonial Property Act.342 
It is clear that a property regime that is out of community of property may not benefit certain 
domestic partners owing to challenges that are already faced in intimate relationships. The 
difficulties that domestic partners may face when drafting contracts should be taken into 
consideration when legislation is enacted regulating domestic partnerships. The joint 
property of registered domestic partners will be discussed in the next paragraph. 
3.2.8  Joint property  
Where a registered domestic partner enters into a contract to dispose of joint property of his 
or her domestic partnership without the consent of the other partner, the contract will be 
void.343 In terms of section 15 of the Matrimonial Property Act344 a contract entered into by a 
spouse without the consent of the other spouse may be valid, provided there is compliance 
with certain requirements.345 However this provision is not in the draft Bill, it would be 
preferable for the same provision to be inserted in the draft Bill in order to protect the interest 
of a third who has suffered loss as a result of concluding a contract with a registered 
domestic partner to dispose of property belonging to the joint estate. 
This provision places registered domestic partners in the same position as spouses married 
in community of property, but still different from spouses under the Marriage Act346 or Civil 
Union Act,347 as division takes place upon dissolution of the civil marriage or civil union by 
court order. While in terms of the draft Bill, dissolution will take place after the termination of 
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a registered domestic partnership.348 Registered domestic partners will have a two year 
period within which to approach a court for a division of property order after the dissolution of 
their domestic partnership. On application after two years, the court may grant permission for 
the division of property if it leads to greater hardship if not provided.349 
The Matrimonial Property Act350 will not be applicable to registered and unregistered 
domestic partners in this regard. Registered domestic partners will not be treated similar to 
civil marriage spouses.351 As a result, registered domestic partners will not be able to incur 
household debts under the draft Bill while civil marriage spouses are able to do so.352 It 
would be preferable for domestic partners to be afforded the opportunity to have the 
Matrimonial Property Act353 applicable to their domestic partnerships. This option should be 
made available to domestic partners by letting them contract for its application in the 
registered domestic partnership agreement.  
The interests of both registered domestic partners will be protected in the joint property. The 
interest of third parties may be prejudiced by conduct of one of the registered domestic 
partners. Redistribution of assets of the registered domestic partners will be discussed in the 
next paragraph. 
3.2.9 Redistribution of assets 
A registered domestic partner will be able to approach a court for the redistribution of assets 
provided he or she has made direct or indirect contributions to the separate property of the 
other registered domestic partner.354 The draft Bill puts registered domestic partners in a 
better position than spouses married in community of property. Sections 7(3)-(6) of the 
Divorce Act355 afford redistribution of assets only to spouses married out of community of 
property, subject to judicial discretion. Redistribution is awarded in limited circumstances 
only.356 These circumstances are: 
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(a) The spouses should have been married prior to the commencement of the 
Matrimonial Property Act357 before 1 November 1984, subject to an ante-nuptial 
contract which excludes community of property, community of profit and loss 
and accrual sharing and any form of accrual sharing; 
(b) The spouses should have been married prior to the commencement of the 
Marriage and Matrimonial Property Law Amendment Act 3 of 1998 before 2 
December 1988 in terms of section 22(6) of the Black Administration Act.358 
 
Registered domestic partners will not be in a better position than spouses who conclude 
their marriage through the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act.359 Customary marriage 
spouses can apply for redistribution of assets even when their marriage was in community of 
property. The court in Gumede v President of the Republic of South Africa360 determined that 
section 7(3) of the Divorce Act361 is applicable to all customary marriages regardless of their 
matrimonial property system.362 The court further determined that a spouse who seeks 
redistribution of assets in a customary marriage does not bear the onus of proof that he or 
she is entitled to redistribution.363 The court must look at all the relevant circumstances 
surrounding the marriage to determine whether redistribution would be just and equitable.364  
Heaton365 argues for the introduction of a broad judicial discretion regarding the division of 
matrimonial property upon divorce. The court should be empowered to deviate from the 
ordinary consequences of the matrimonial property system if equity and justice demand this. 
She argues that in order for the court to `determine whether equity and justice demand a 
deviation the court should take into account, inter alia, the career or business sacrifices or 
curtailing participation in the labour or business market of women due to their child-care and 
elder responsibilities and household duties.366 The same broad judicial discretion should be 
afforded to registered domestic partners. Treating customary marriages spouses differently 
to other intimate relationships for purposes of redistribution of asserts amounts to unfair 
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discrimination on the ground of equality and ignores financial and social inequalities 
experienced by intimate partner upon divorce or termination of their relationships.367 
Registered domestic partners can apply for redistribution of assets, although just for joint 
property. The invariable consequences of a registered domestic partnership will be 
discussed in the next paragraph. 
3.3  Invariable consequences of a registered domestic partnership 
3.3.1  The common home 
Both registered domestic partners will have the right to occupy the family home during the 
existence of their domestic partnership.368 Both partners will be protected against eviction 
from the other partner.369  
3.3.2  Duty of support 
The duty of support is defined in the draft Bill as “the responsibility of each registered 
domestic partner to provide for the other partner’s basic living expenses while the registered 
domestic partnership exists”.370 Registered domestic partners will owe each other a duty of 
support resulting from registration of their domestic partnership. As a result, registered 
domestic partners will not need to conclude a contract or prove the existence of a 
contractual duty of support. The duty of support vests by operation of law.371 
3.3.3  Delictual claims 
A registered domestic partner can institute a delictual claim against any wrongful third party. 
A partner in a registered domestic partnership is further regarded as a dependant for the 
purpose of the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act.372  
It is clear that registered domestic partners will be afforded most of the consequences of a 
civil marriage upon registration of a domestic partnership. Some of the consequences of a 
civil marriage are afforded to a spouse upon divorce. Consequently, the manner in which a 
registered domestic partnership can be terminated will be discussed in the next paragraph. 
 
                                                          
367  Heaton Family law 136-137. 
368  Cl 11(1) 
369  Cl 11(2). 
370  Cl 1. 
371  The duty of support encompasses many elements that are important to an intimate 
relationship, such as accommodation, clothing, food, medical, and dental services (Skelton et 
al Family law 62-63). 
372  Act 130 of 1993. Cl 9. 
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3.4  Termination of a registered domestic partnership 
A registered domestic partnership can be terminated by the death of one or both partners, by 
agreement or by a court order.373 
3.4.1  Termination by death 
Upon the death of one or both partners, a domestic partnership will terminate.374 A 
registered domestic partner will be considered to be a “spouse” in terms of the Intestate 
Succession Act.375 Registered domestic partners will be placed in the same position as 
spouses married in terms of the Civil Union Act376 or the Marriage Act377 with regard to 
intestate succession. This changes the current position where heterosexual domestic 
partners are unable to inherit intestate, as they are not included in the definition of “spouse” 
in terms of section 1 of the Intestate Succession Act.378 
A surviving partner in a registered domestic partnership can institute a maintenance claim in 
terms of the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act379 against the deceased estate.380 For 
the purpose of the draft Bill, the word “spouse” in section 1 of the Maintenance of Surviving 
Spouses Act381 will be construed to include a partner in a registered domestic partnership.382 
It was clear from Volks that a surviving domestic partner will not be afforded any legal 
protection in terms of section 2(1) of the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act.383 However, 
it is a positive step for domestic partners to know that a surviving partner can rely on the 
provisions of the draft Bill to claim for maintenance in terms of the Maintenance of Surviving 
Spouses Act384 should the draft Bill be passed into law.  
3.4.2 Termination by agreement 
The process of termination is overseen by a registration officer.385 The officer must sign the 
prescribed documents after each domestic partner declares their desire to terminate the 
partnership in writing. Upon termination, a registration officer is required to keep a register of 
                                                          
373  Cl 12(1). 
374  Cl 12(1)(a). 
375  Act 81 of 1987. Cl 20. 
376   Act 17 of 2006. 
377   Act 25 of 1961. 
378   Act 81 of 1987. 
379   Act 27 of 1990. 
380  Cl 19. 
381   27 of 1990. 
382  Cl 19. 
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384   Act 27 of 1990. 
385  CL 13. 
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all terminated registered domestic partnerships and transmit the register to all relevant 
officials for inclusion in the population register.386  
Termination by agreement is not best equipped to address gender inequality in domestic 
partnerships. It will be left to domestic partners to negotiate the terms of their termination. 
The emotionally and financially weaker domestic partners will lack the autonomy to bargain 
equally. Nor will he or she have the protection of the court to scrutinise the fairness of the 
terms of termination.387 For this reason, it would be preferable for the court to have judicial 
discretion over termination agreements in order to ensure that weaker partners are 
protected. Thus the court should ensure there is equity and justice. The extent to which the 
partners were in an unequal bargaining position when they signed their domestic partnership 
agreement should be taken into account, as well as any subsequent change in the 
circumstances of the domestic partners when the termination agreement is signed. 
3.4.3 Termination by court order 
A registered domestic partnership can only be terminated by a court order when domestic 
partners have minor children.388 The court will award a court order for the termination of a 
domestic partnership only if it is satisfied that termination is in the best interest of children.389 
It would be preferable if domestic partners could be able to go to court even if there are no 
children involved. 
                                                          
386  Cl 13(6)-(8). 
387  Smith LLD Thesis UFS 595.  
388  Cl 15. The court may order any person to appear before it and the court may further appoint a 
legal representative to represent children (Cl 16(2), (4) and (7)). The court has the power to 
make provision with regard to maintenance, education, guardianship, care or contact of 
children. Children in registered domestic partnerships will be placed in a similar position to 
children in civil marriages in terms of s 6 of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979. Cl 16 of the draft Bill 
does not provide the court with the power to amend, vary or suspend a maintenance order. 
Should it later turn out that the order initially made by the court is no longer in the best 
interests of children or that the order has become unsuitable, the court will not be able to 
amend it (Smith LLD thesis UFS 608-612). In MN v AJ 2013 (3) SA 26 (WCC) the respondent 
paid maintenance for a child born of the respondent’s marriage in accordance with a divorce 
order granted in terms of s 6 of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979. The plaintiff grew suspicious 
about the paternity of the child and paternity tests were done. The tests revealed that the 
child, who was 15 years at the time, was not the biological child of the respondent (par 4-5 
and 45). The plaintiff applied to court for an amendment of the maintenance order in terms of 
s 8 of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979 to the end that the respondent could be relieved of his 
maintenance obligations. The court amended the maintenance order (par 5-6). Although the 
court will take proper measures to ensure that a termination order will be in the best interest of 
the child, the possibility exists that, after making the termination order, circumstances might 
change which makes the order unfavourable and in need of variation or suspension (s 8(1) of 
the Divorce Act 70 of 1979). S 8(1) of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979 should be incorporated into 
cl 16 of the draft Bill. The court, however, warned of the need to be cautious when recognising 
claims where the maternity or paternity of a child is in dispute. Such claims have the potential 
to destroy long established parental relationships and might not be in the best interest of the 
child to award such claims or for the child to find out about this experience in court (par 79). 
389  Cl 16.  
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If domestic partners do not have children, the only avenue to terminate their partnership is 
by agreement. However, the problem is that one or both partners may not reach an 
agreement regarding termination. The draft Bill is silent on whether the court can grant 
termination where one of the partners does not agree to termination. Furthermore, courts are 
not empowered to determine whether termination is justified based on the circumstances of 
the parties.390 The draft Bill should make it possible for domestic partners to terminate their 
partnerships unilaterally.  
The ways in which a domestic partnership can be terminated were discussed in the previous 
paragraph. It was pointed out that regulating termination by agreement in courts can result in 
shortcomings. The process can bring hardships to domestic partners owing to inequality 
issues between partners, particularly in a country such as South Africa where the adversarial 
system operates. As a result termination of a domestic partnership should be regulated by a 
system that endeavours to level inequalities between parties and assist in addressing the 
needs and reaching amicable agreement for both parties. Mediation will be discussed in the 
next paragraph as a solution to regulating termination of domestic partnerships. 
3.5  Mediating domestic partnerships 
It would be preferable for registered domestic partners to mediate before going to court, to 
draft a termination agreement or partners should be referred by court for mediation. 
Mediation takes into account the need for the continued contact of both parents for the 
benefit of children, thus regarding the best interest of the child as paramount.391 Through 
mediation, domestic partners will be able to address all of their issues holistically in the 
presence of an unbiased third party and the court will be approached only as a matter of last 
resort should mediation fail.392  
It has been argued that parties should opt for post-divorce mediation on the grounds that it is 
most suitable for women who are in a financially weaker position after divorce as they face 
scarce work opportunities.393 As a result, it would be preferable that mediation is also made 
a possibility for partners upon the termination of their domestic partnerships. Mediation is 
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391  De Jong “The newly introduced public mediation service in the maintenance court 
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supported in this study as the best option for termination of a registered domestic 
partnership owing to the following characteristics of mediation: 394 
(1) Mediation is a socio-legal process and the negotiation process of mediation is 
facilitated by an impartial and neutral third party while decisions are taken by 
the parties.  
(2) The mediator is not directly involved in the mediation, however assist parties in 
reaching a mutual agreement that benefits both parties and their children while 
focusing on future relations.  
(3) The mediation process is confidential and complies with the law or public 
policy. The mediation process can also be adapted with the dispute of the 
parties in order to assist the parties to reach an outcome that meet their needs. 
 
De Jong395 explains that the flexibility of mediation enables the process to solve many of the 
challenges faced in court by families during separation. Mediation has disadvantages but 
similar disadvantages are present and can be worse in litigation.396 For instance, unequal 
bargaining powers during litigation are a feature of an adversarial system. Mediation is more 
likely to reconcile than heighten the differences between parties.397  
Although there is a threat that parties may not feel obliged to abide by their agreement, a 
method of ensuring parties abide by their agreement could be by ensuring that the mediation 
agreement is made an order of court. Consequently parties will know that there will be legal 
consequences or the matter may end up in court should they refuse, fail to reach a 
settlement or should they not abide by their agreement.398  
The different phases of mediation are aimed at renegotiating family relationships and also 
help parties in maintaining continuity rather than the “winner takes all” approach of 
adversarial systems.399 Termination of a domestic partnership will not spell the end of the 
partners’ obligations to each other. Certain obligations will continue upon termination such 
as the duty of support towards children and maintenance between partners. The 
maintenance obligations of the partners upon termination will be discussed in the next 
paragraph.  
                                                          
394  De Jong 2005 THRHR 96. 
395  Ibid at 101-102. 
396  De Jong “Opportunities for mediation in the new Children’s Act 38 of 2005” 2008 THRHR 630-
641. 
397  Mediation is less expensive than litigation and is in the best interests of the child owing to the 
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398  De Jong 2005 THRHR 636-637. 
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3.6  Maintenance after termination 
Registered domestic partners can enter into a maintenance agreement to be applicable 
upon termination of their partnership.400 Where domestic partners have not reached an 
agreement regarding post-termination maintenance, they can approach the court for a 
maintenance order. The court will make an order which it deems just and equitable under the 
particular circumstances.401 
A registered domestic partner can apply for a maintenance order upon termination even if no 
provision was made for maintenance or within two years thereafter.402 The maintenance 
order granted by the court may continue for as long as the domestic partner receiving 
maintenance continues to live, concludes or registers another domestic partnership or 
registers a civil union, customary or civil marriage.403 When deciding to order payment of 
maintenance and the amount and nature of the maintenance, the court will consider:404 
“(a) the respective contributions of each partner to the registered domestic partnership; 
the existing and prospective means of each of the registered domestic partners; 
(b) the respective earning capacities, future, financial needs and obligations of each 
of the registered partners; 
(c) the age of the registered partners; 
(d) the duration of the registered domestic partnership; 
(e) the standard of living of the registered domestic partners prior to the termination of 
the registered domestic partnership; and 
(f) any other factor which in the opinion of the court should be taken into account.” 
 
Smith405 notes that the draft Bill is more restrictive than section 7(2) of the Divorce Act.406 
The Divorce Act407 allows a maintenance order in terms of section 7(2) to terminate only 
when the indebted spouse dies or remarries. Section 7(2) does not contemplate a situation 
where the indebted partner concludes a civil union or alternatively registers a domestic 
partnership. Civil marriage spouses will, however, not be able to claim maintenance after 
divorce if no provision was made in the divorce order. It is possible under the draft Bill to 
claim maintenance even when no provision was made for maintenance upon the termination 
                                                          
400  Cl 18(1). 
401  Cl 18(1). 
402  Cl 18(1) and 23. 
403  Cl 18(1). 
404  Cl 18(2). 
405  Smith “The statutory domestic partnership cometh” (Family Law 2010) in Atkin (ed) The 
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of a domestic partnership. Such a claim can be brought within two years after termination of 
a registered domestic partnership.408 The court will have the power to grant maintenance 
orders that resemble divorce order maintenance.409 
 
It is clear that many of the provisions in the draft Bill will afford better legal protection to 
registered domestic partners. However, there are also provisions which may not best serve 
the interest of registered domestic partners such as termination by agreement. The draft Bill 
also aims to protect domestic partners who may not be able to register their domestic 
partnerships. The recognition that will be extended to unregistered domestic partners will 
consequently be discussed in the next paragraph. 
3.7  Unregistered domestic partnerships 
The SALRC in the 2006 Report had a choice between a de facto model and a judicial 
discretion model to regulate unregistered domestic partnerships.410 A de facto model entails 
that domestic partners who have not registered their domestic partnership will be awarded 
with a civil status by legislation as if they had formalised their domestic partnerships.411 Thus 
unregistered domestic partners will also be afforded legal protection during their domestic 
partnership. In addition, the domestic partners do not have to be aware of the existence of 
such legislation to qualify for protection.412 With the judicial discretion model, domestic 
partners may attempt to regulate the financial consequences of their partnerships privately 
or they may approach the court for a just and equitable order with regard to the financial 
consequences upon termination of their domestic partnership. The judicial discretion model 
becomes applicable upon the termination of an unregistered domestic partnership.413 
The SALRC opted for a judicial discretion model as it was submitted that the de facto model 
is difficult to prove. Most importantly, the emotionally and financially weaker partners in 
domestic partnerships often need protection upon the termination of a domestic partnership. 
The judicial discretion model was seen as the appropriate model to regulate unregistered 
domestic partnerships.414 Unregistered domestic partners will be afforded the opportunity 
                                                          
408  Cl 18. 
409  Cl 18; Smith 2011 SALJ 565. 
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412  SALRC (2003) 10.3. 
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upon termination of contracting for financial aspects of their domestic partnerships before 
they approach a court for a just and equitable settlement where there is a dispute.415                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Unregistered domestic partners do not receive automatic protection under the draft Bill. A 
party to an unregistered domestic partnership can, however, after termination of the 
domestic partnership “opt in” by applying to a court for the enforcement of some of the 
consequences of a registered domestic partnership as the draft Bill envisages a default 
system to unregistered domestic partnerships. The court will then consider appropriate relief 
on an ad hoc basis after considering the following factors:416  
“(a)  the duration and nature of the relationship; 
(b)  the nature and extent of the common residence; 
(c)  the degree of financial dependence or interdependence, and any arrangements 
for financial support, between the unregistered domestic partners; 
(d)  the ownership, use and acquisition of property; 
(e)  the degree of mutual commitment to a shared life; 
(f)  the care and support of children of the unregistered domestic partners; 
(g)  the performance of household duties; 
(h)  the reputation and public aspects of the relationship; and 
(i)  the relationship status of the unregistered domestic partners with third parties.” 
 
The above list is not a numerus clausus and the court can consider any other relevant 
factor.417 Before the court can grant the award, it has to ascertain whether either or both 
unregistered domestic partners have concluded a civil marriage, civil union or registered a 
domestic partnership with a third party. A domestic partner who is already married will, thus, 
not be afforded protection under the draft Bill.418 Emotionally and financially weaker partners 
who are unable to insist on registration of a domestic partnership will find relief upon 
termination of their domestic partnership.419 The consequences of an unregistered domestic 
partnership will consequently be discussed in the next paragraph. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
discretion model is the stage at which the status of marriage like relationship or de facto 
relationship is determined” (SALRC (2006) 7.2.7-7.2.9). 
415  Cl 7, 8, 12, 14, 15, 18, 22, 23 and 24. 
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3.7.1  Termination 
An unregistered domestic partnership can be terminated either by death or separation. Upon 
termination, one or both partners may approach a court for a maintenance claim, intestate 
succession claim or a property division claim. 
3.7.1.1 Maintenance after death 
A surviving unregistered domestic partner may bring an application to court after the death of 
his or her partner to be awarded maintenance in accordance with his or her reasonable 
maintenance needs.420 Registered domestic partners will be construed as spouses for 
purposes of the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act,421 while an unregistered domestic 
partner will rely on the court to make an order which the court deems just to provide for his 
or her reasonable maintenance needs.422  
3.7.1.2 Maintenance upon termination 
A domestic partner may apply to court to be awarded a maintenance order upon separation 
of an unregistered domestic partnership. One or both unregistered domestic partners may, 
upon separation approach a court to apply for the payment of maintenance, the court may 
make an order that is a just and equitable.423 It will be in the discretion of the court to 
ascertain whether awarding a maintenance order is justified.424 Unregistered domestic 
partners will rely on the surrounding factors of their domestic partnership as opposed to 
registered domestic partners who will be afforded the duty of support as soon as their 
domestic partnership is registered. The maintenance order granted to an unregistered 
domestic partner lasts for a specific period determined by the court.425 It is uncertain in the 
draft Bill how long this period will be.426  
The court should exercise a wider discretion beyond the ex lege duty of support in favour of 
unregistered domestic partnerships. Thus the maintenance order could be extended to an 
unregistered domestic partner until the partner concludes a civil or customary marriage, civil 
union or registers a domestic partnership or is a partner in another unregistered domestic 
partnership.  
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3.7.2 Intestate succession  
An unregistered domestic partner will be able to bring an application for an intestate 
succession order. A surviving unregistered domestic partner can further be awarded the 
intestate succession order even when there is a competing claim from a customary marriage 
spouse who was married to the deceased.427  
The competing intestate succession claims are limited only to a surviving unregistered 
domestic partner and a surviving customary marriage spouse.428 Thus a surviving 
unregistered domestic partner will not be entitled to the intestate succession order if the 
deceased was party to a civil marriage while in an unregistered domestic partnership with 
the surviving unregistered domestic partner.429 
3.7.3  Property division 
Unregistered domestic partners can conclude a contract during or after the termination of 
their domestic partnership to regulate the division of their domestic partnership property.430 
The division of property will be left in the hands of the court to make an award that is just and 
equitable taking into account all relevant factors that existed during the unregistered 
domestic partnership.431 Mediation can provide a solution if domestic partners cannot agree 
on division. Thus, provision should be made for mediation before domestic partners 
approach the court for relief.432 
The draft Bill affords registered and unregistered domestic partners similar rights with regard 
to concluding an agreement to regulate the division of property and also approaching a court 
for relief where there is no agreement or where the content of the agreement causes dispute 
or prejudices one of the domestic partners. The factors that the court will consider in 
awarding a division of property are similar for registered and unregistered domestic 
partnerships, however registered domestic partners have to attach their domestic 
partnership agreement or refer to the agreement in their registration certificate otherwise the 
court will not consider the agreement.433 
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Unregistered domestic partnerships will be afforded legal protection after termination of a 
domestic partnership. The draft Bill is a positive step towards regulation of domestic 
partnerships, however the draft Bill will add to a hierarchy of intimate relationships that 
already exist in South African family law. The hierarchy will be discussed in the next 
paragraph. 
3.8  A hierarchy of intimate relationships 
The common law definition of marriage is still applied despite the fact that it was declared 
unconstitutional.434 A draft Bill has been drafted to co-exist with all the other intimate 
relationships. Marriage is regarded as the preferred intimate relationship. All other intimate 
relationships are regarded as inferior.435 Domestic partners, whether registered or not, will 
be afforded fewer rights than those accorded to civil marriage spouses. As a result, domestic 
partners will feel that their intimate relationship is less important than civil marriage. The 
differences between married and unmarried people will continue to exist even though the 
Constitution forbids unfair discrimination on the ground of marital status, sex and upholds the 
right to equality and dignity.436 A hierarchy exist in South African family law on a sociological 
level that need to be eradicated.437  
Bakker438 notes that there are too many different sets of legislation with different procedures 
that regulates the registration, legal consequences and termination of intimate relationships 
in South Africa. As a result it is difficult for the ordinary couple on the street to understand 
which legislation is best suited to formalise their intimate relationship, is less expensive, less 
formal and which consequences are best for their intimate relationship. When these couples 
finally understand the consequences of different legislation they are likely to realise that all 
these intimate relationships have similar consequences upon registration. This leads to the 
question of why there need to be different Acts and procedures when the legal 
consequences of formalising intimate relationships are similar?  
3.9  Preliminary conclusion 
It was stated in the introduction to this chapter that a Bill regulating domestic partnerships 
has been drafted. The draft Bill might offer domestic partners hope that in future their 
intimate relationships will be regulated by legislation in the same way as civil marriages, 
customary marriages and civil unions. There are estates that need to be wound up and 
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many claims that need to be addressed while domestic partners wait for the draft Bill to be 
promulgated. Despite the proposed draft Bill, domestic partners are still without protection. 
Progress was made with the publication of the draft Bill but unfortunately nothing further has 
happened since the draft Bill was published in 2008.  
It cannot be disputed that domestic partnerships legislation will afford more legal recognition 
to domestic partnership than what is currently afforded to domestic partners.439 Amendments 
were proposed to the draft Bill.440 However it should be emphasised that the proposed 
amendments are made with the purpose of ensuring a more efficient method of regulating 
domestic partnerships should the draft Bill be enacted. After all, any protection is better and 
will be appreciated by domestic partners. The draft Bill should be seen as a positive step 
towards regulating domestic partnerships rather than an answer to challenges faced by 
domestic partnerships owing to inequalities. A more appropriate approach than the draft Bill 
will be recommended in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4  
Recommendations 
4.1  Introduction 
In this chapter recommendations will be made with the aim of finding solutions to the current 
insufficient regulation of domestic partnerships. The draft Domestic Partnership Bill will solve 
many of the problems faced by domestic partners, should the draft Bill be passed into law. 
However, the draft Bill should not be seen as a proper solution to regulating domestic 
partnerships.441 The proper solution to regulating domestic partnerships is through a 
functional approach which will be discussed in this chapter. 
Over the years it has been suggested that domestic partners should endeavour to regulate 
their partnerships through contracts that will enable them to affix some of the invariable 
consequences of marriage to their partnerships. Contracts, however are not best equipped 
to afford proper legal protection to intimate partners owing to unequal bargaining positions 
that exist in intimate relationships. 
The terms of ante-nuptial contracts, universal partnership agreements, domestic partnership 
agreements or registration of domestic partnerships are negotiated by individuals 
privately.442 The state has no role to play. When there is a dispute, the matter is taken to 
litigation in an adversarial system that does very little to come to the aid of vulnerable 
partners.443 Many men and women in intimate relationships enter or negotiate contracts 
already affected by unemployment, dependence, poverty, patriarchy, gender inequality and 
economically weaker positions. These factors lead to unequal bargaining positions.444 The 
concern for many men and women when signing contracts is shelter and evading poverty.445 
Such men and women, therefore focus less on the prejudices these contracts bring to them. 
As a result the terms of a contract concluded often favours the stronger partner.446 
Furthermore an intimate relationship contract is signed at the beginning of a marriage or 
domestic partnership. Contracts only reflect the position of the parties at the time the 
contract was signed. At the beginning of intimate relationships, parties may be less focused 
                                                          
441  The draft Domestic Partnership Bill will add to an already complex situation regulating intimate 
relationships in South Africa (Bakker 2009 JJS 18-19). 
442  Bonthuys “Family contracts” 2004 SALJ 879-901. 
443  Ibid at 880. 
444  Sinclair and Heaton The law of marriage 302. 
445  Despite major strides for gender equality, gender discrimination and patriarchy hierarchies 
continue to exist. For as long as inequality and patriarchy exist, contracts are not the best 
form of regulating intimate relationships (Boshoff “Fractured landscape of family law” 2001 
SALJ 312-328). 
446   Sinclair and Heaton The law of marriage 302. 
63 
 
on the future.447 As a result they fail to contemplate unforeseen circumstances. For instance 
breakdown of a relationship is not contemplated and the consequences thereof are not 
provided for.448 
It is clear regulation of intimate relationships through contracts presents problems for 
partners. As a result intimate relationships should be regulated by an approach that limits 
discrimination and the lack of free choice to marry. The approach will consequently be 
discussed in the next paragraph. 
4.2  Development of a functional approach 
The formal approach where the focus is on the official status of the parties has made way for 
a functional approach in countries such as Australia and New Zealand.449 The formal 
approach has been criticized for not being in reality with the increasing forms of families that 
exist outside traditional marriage.450 
A functional approach focuses on the substance rather than the form of an intimate 
relationship.451 According to the functional approach intimate relationships should be 
afforded legal protection based on the functions they serve rather than focusing on the 
formalities or the marital status of the partners.452 Thus the only difference between marriage 
and domestic partnerships are public commitment, a marriage certificate and the formalities 
spouses go through to formalise their marriage.453 All functions served by marriage are 
similarly served by domestic partnerships. If a marriage is important for providing a stable 
parent child relationship, permanence, commitment, physical and emotional involvements, 
then domestic partnerships also serve the same functions. Domestic partners love each 
other, provide food, shelter and medical care for one another. All the consequences of 
marriage are extended to intimate relationships that play a similar role as marriage. This 
approach helps alleviate the financial hardships faced by vulnerable parties and their 
children upon breakdown of an intimate relationship. This approach opposes the formal 
approach and the registration system proposed in the draft Domestic Partnership Bill. 
Inequality makes the free choice to marry or formalise intimate relationships difficult. A 
registration system proposed in the draft Bill will not benefit weaker parties who do not have 
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the choice to register an intimate relationship or understand the consequence of such 
registration or of failure to register their domestic partnership.454 
Meyerson455 notes that the Constitutional Court has kept abreast with contemporary 
changes in family law and refers to a number of Constitutional Court judgments which have 
used the equality clause to invalidate legislation which did not extend certain spousal benefit 
to intimate relationships outside traditional marriage such as same-sex domestic 
partnerships and Muslim marriages. The extension of certain marriage benefits to these 
intimate relationships is welcomed, however the court have failed to develop a functional 
approach in the process.456 What the Constitutional Court has done is extend spousal 
benefits in cases such as Gory and Daniels rather than finding that there was unfair 
discrimination between married and unmarried couples.457 The spousal benefits extended to 
same-sex domestic partnerships and Muslim marriages have not been extended to 
heterosexual domestic partnerships.458 As a result Meyerson459 contends that the 
Constitutional Court has discriminated against people who have chosen not to marry and 
those who do not have free choice to marry. Vulnerable domestic partners should be 
afforded legal protection. Choosing not to marry whether by choice or by circumstances 
does not mean that a person has chosen not to be afforded legal protection.460  
Meyerson461 argues that the approach adopted by the Constitutional Court favours certain 
intimate relationships, particularly same-sex domestic partnerships and religious domestic 
partnerships. In Daniels the Constitutional Court read the word spouse into section 1 of the 
Intestate Succession Act462 and surviving spouse into section 2(1) of the Maintenance of 
Surviving spouses Act463 to include a party in a monogamous Muslim marriage.464 The 
choice to conclude a formal marriage was available to such a party but was not told by the 
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constitutional court that they chose not to marry while in Volks the “choice argument” was 
used not to recognise Mrs Robinson as a surviving spouse in terms of section 2(1) of the 
Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act.465 Meyerson466 argues that the reason used to justify 
the formal approach is based on moral and religious principles. She argues that the law is 
being used to encourage people to get married by denying those who are not married 
spousal benefits even when their intimate relationships functions similar to marriage. 
Religious and moral principles are furthered despite the fact that they are not shared by 
everyone in a diverse and pluralistic society such as South Africa.  
She argues that there are no sufficient reasons to justify the superior status afforded to 
marriage. 467 As a result marriage should not be recognised in order to achieve neutrality 
and treat all intimate relationships equally.468 Extending spousal benefits to intimate 
relationships in certain circumstances shows progress to identify evolving forms of intimate 
relationships, however this is only a short term solution. A more appropriate solution is to 
extend all the consequences of marriage to intimate relationships that function similar to 
marriage.469  
Coetzee and Louw470 note that the functional approach will provide extensive protection to 
domestic partners. However they oppose the approach on the strength that proving a family 
nexus is a challenge that may cause the functional approach not to be a success.471 They 
pose the question whether a family nexus should be proved before or after determining the 
existence of a domestic partnership?472 The functional approach may not be accepted by 
everyone who values the institution of marriage for moralistic, religious views and its public 
commitment, after all marriage creates certainty of proof from the moment it is concluded.473 
Thus a functional approach may raise uncertainties with regard to the type of domestic 
partnership, length of time or the level of commitment and the criteria that should be used to 
determine whether an intimate relationship is worthy of legal protection.474 However it is 
contended that certainty is not an issue with a functional approach. Functions such as 
maintaining the household, sharing a home, the duration of a domestic partnership, 
dependence and the existence of children and any other relevant function should point 
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towards a family that is worthy of legal protection.475 However there are circumstances 
where a functional approach may not be used, such as where family functions are not 
performed. An example, is where two or more people are merely sharing a home without 
being in an intimate relationship.476 
Intimate partners who want to marry owing to the significance attached to marriage and 
certainty of proof can still get married. However the state should not confer any status on 
marriage or have any role in protecting marriage as more important than other intimate 
relationships.477 Religious organisations can be responsible for regulating marriages and 
have their own rules. Intimate partners can still decide the form of their marriages, such as 
same-sex or heterosexual, monogamous or polygamous. Partners can further choose the 
religious or private organisations that endorse the form of marriage or ceremony they prefer. 
Meyerson’s suggestion is supported in this study. The state should not control marriages, 
partners can still conclude ante-nuptial contracts or any other form of contract to regulate the 
consequences of their marriage. The marriage certificate or contracts partners conclude will 
be proof of the existence of an intimate relationship. The state will be involved when there 
are disputes concerning such contracts.  
This approach will also accommodate the autonomy of those who do not want all the 
consequences of marriage in their relationships, parties should be able to opt out of what 
Meyerson478 refers to as the ‘the levelling up regime’ which extend all the consequences of 
marriage to all forms of intimate relationships. She notes that parties should still be free to 
enter into a contract stating how they would like their property to be divided upon termination 
of their intimate relationship.479 Parties can make provision for maintenance by signing an 
opt out contract. This will allow parties to preserve their autonomy while also protecting the 
interest of vulnerable parties who lack free choice to marry.480 However it should be clear to 
partners who have free choice to marry but fail to conclude an opt out contract that when a 
domestic partnership is started, the law will automatically attach consequences to their 
relationship even when such partners do not have the intention of committing to such a 
relationship. The functional approach may encroach on the autonomy of parties who do not 
want to attach consequences to their intimate relationships; however the encroachment 
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should be justified in order to achieve substantive equality for vulnerable partners in intimate 
relationships.481  
It is recommended that a functional approach should be adopted to afford domestic 
partnerships full legal protection. When it is clear that partners perform family functions, it 
should be an indication that partners are a family worthy of protection.482 Courts should 
determine the existence of a domestic partnership from the functions partners perform within 
the relationship.483 There should no longer be a need to register or formalise intimate 
relationships. The approach used by the constitutional court has resulted in the enactment of 
the Civil Union Act484 and the Recognition of Customary Marriages.485 However the 
approach cannot be supported, it only extend marital benefits to other intimate relationships 
while the status of marriage as an important social institution is kept despite the lack of 
sufficient reason to do so.486  
The law should not differentiate between civil marriage and other intimate relationships. If 
domestic partners love and support each other, there is affection and all the elements of 
consortium omnis vitae487 are present, then there is no reason for differentiating between 
domestic partnerships and a civil marriage.488 Heterosexual marriage should not be the 
hallmark of all intimate relationships in modern South African family law. South African family 
law should be regulated by the law of general application with similar consequences for all 
intimate relationships including domestic partnerships.489 The decision in Volks is not the 
solution. The current state of family law in South Africa has to be challenged and developed 
in order to afford equal protection to all intimate relationships. Failure to develop family law 
would imply that things have stayed the same for intimate relationships such as domestic 
partnerships in the post-1994 era despite the progress that has been made to develop many 
areas of family law.490  
If we take the case of Mrs Robinson in Volks, it was clear that Mrs Robinson had been in a 
domestic partnership with the deceased for a period of 16 years and the facts thereof were 
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not disputed. Mrs Robinson should have been identified as a surviving spouse and afforded 
the benefits of the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act.491 It would have been preferable 
had the court not focused on the free choice of the domestic partners to marry when 
determining whether Mrs Robinson should be identified as a surviving spouse.492  
It would have been preferable for the court to follow a functional approach as the court would 
have focused on the functions Mrs Robinson performed in the relationship. By following a 
functional approach, the court would have identified that Mrs Robinson and the deceased 
lived together as man and woman who loved, supported and shared a common home, in a 
permanent domestic partnership. This should have been sufficient to afford Mrs Robinson 
legal protection as a surviving spouse in terms of the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses 
Act.493 This should be the way forward for affording domestic partnerships legal protection. A 
functional approach should be developed guided by legal pluralism, cultural diversity, a 
tolerance of difference and social values.494 A functional approach will recognise that the 
choice to marry or register a domestic partnership is difficult to make in South Africa. 
4.3  Conclusion 
This study has been undertaken with the purpose of answering the question whether 
domestic partnerships should be afforded full legal recognition in South African law. In light 
of the fact that there is currently no legislation regulating domestic partnerships while most 
intimate relationships are regulated by designated legislation. The reasoning for the lack of 
legal recognition is the fact that domestic partners form relationships outside the law and as 
a consequence domestic partners are not afforded protection by the law.495 It is argued, 
however, that domestic partnerships resemble marriage in so far as responsibilities, 
obligations, dependencies and duties of support arise from domestic partnerships.496 The 
problem is that, during and after breakdown of domestic partnerships, partners have no 
automatic legal protection. Domestic partners are left with no automatic rights to 
maintenance, duty of support, property, inheritance or any legal recourse against the estate 
of the other partner.  
In Chapter 2, attention was paid to the current regulation of domestic partnerships. In the 
South African context, there are fewer households that consist of a nuclear family owing to 
factors that force people into domestic partnerships. Domestic partnerships are seen as 
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immoral by some members of society. Same-sex domestic partners are regulated by specific 
legislation despite the fact that the choice to marry is open to them in light of the enactment 
of the Civil Union Act.497  
The issue of affording protection to domestic partners has come before the Constitutional 
Court in Volks. The approach of the Constitutional Court has been to protect the freedom of 
a person to make choices about his or her intimate relationship without the law infringing on 
that choice.498 The Constitutional Court in Volks has set the precedence that discriminating 
between married and unmarried people is not unconstitutional.499 However this precedence 
should not be accepted where it affects many vulnerable families in need of legal protection. 
International instruments refer to the importance of family life and marriage without any 
preference for marriage.500 As a result, it would be preferable that a system that places 
family life as a foundation and cornerstone of society is developed.  
In chapter 3, the draft Domestic Partnerships Bill was analysed to ascertain whether it is the 
best platform to regulate domestic partnerships. The drafting of the Bill is a positive step 
towards affording domestic partners legal protection. However the draft Bill has not been 
promulgated. It is not clear when or whether the draft Bill will become an Act of parliament.  
One of the reasons for the drafting of the Bill was to achieve a measure of equality for 
domestic partners and to afford domestic partners protection similar to other intimate 
relationships such as civil marriage.501 Equality has not, however, been achieved. The draft 
Bill in its current form will not address all of the problems faced by domestic partners neither 
will it treat registered and unregistered domestic partners equally. It will, however, go a long 
way towards protecting vulnerable domestic partners. 
In chapter 4, recommendations were made on how best to regulate all forms of intimate 
relationships in South Africa. It was stated that the current regulation of family law in South 
Africa is unsatisfactory owing to its reliance on contracts. As a result, the solution to the 
crisis created by comparing all intimate relationships to civil marriage needs to be sought. It 
is not fair to regulate intimate relationships through a system that does not properly reflect 
their challenges.  
Some of the problems faced by domestic partners such as inequality are not of their own 
making but are forced on them. The problem in South Africa is that many families want to be 
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part of a nuclear family and make free choices regarding their intimate relationships. That is, 
however, made difficult owing to factors mentioned in chapter two.502 It is the responsibility of 
the law to find ways to respond to challenges faced by the vulnerable in society, especially 
where particular people have been victims of past injustices. The current reaction of the law 
has been to protect marriage and the autonomy of parties to make choices regarding their 
intimate relationships.503  
In the process, the law has neglected the plight of the vulnerable in a society highly 
characterized by inequalities. As a result, justice is denied to domestic partners who do not 
have free choice to marry.504 If a person is unable to make a choice to marry, what is the 
purpose of telling that person they have chosen not to marry and the law cannot protect 
them?  
The conclusion reached in this study is that domestic partnerships should be afforded 
protection based on the functions they serve. The criteria in South Africa to afford any 
intimate relationship should, thus, be determined by the functions families serve.505 Any 
enquiry into the marital status or the ability of domestic partners to marry should not form 
part of the criteria at all. Neither should the law seek to protect the autonomy of individual 
domestic partners at the expense of ignoring the more compelling plight of vulnerable 
domestic partners.506 South African family law has shown a willingness to acknowledge the 
diversity, legal pluralism and discrimination faced by South African families with the 
enactment of the Civil Union Act507 and the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act.508 In 
the process, they showed that the concept of marriage is not stagnant but can be 
evolutionary. There is no argument that should be used to protect marriage at the expense 
of excluding domestic partnerships.509 Domestic partnerships have to be protected, and the 
answer to challenges faced by domestic partnerships and many vulnerable partners in South 
Africa is the functional approach. I therefore conclude that the judgment of the Constitutional 
Court in Volks was incorrect. The diversity and plurality of the South African society does not 
allow for legal protection of intimate relationships to be determined based on the choice 
argument and the importance attached to marriage.  
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